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SHOULD THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
DISCARD ITS VEST?*

Daniel M. Schuylerf"
III. THE RULE

AS APPLIED

TO REMOTENESS OF VESTING ALONE

ROM what has preceded it is apparent that none of those who
would reform the rule against perpetuities, excepting Professor Simes, has suggested that the rule's application to remoteness
of vesting alone requires investigation. Yet there is little doubt
that this aspect of the rule has caused as much if not more litigation than those which have been so harshly condemned. Proof
of this assertion will not be undertaken, for every property
lmvyer knows how frequently courts are called upon to determine
whether for purposes of the rule an interest is "vested" or "contingent." Professor Simes put it well when he said, "I doubt
whether any other question in the law of estates has caused so
much litigation as the question of the vested or contingent character of the interest. If all the decisions on the matter were laid
end to end, I know not how many times around the globe they
would extend."182 One may justifiably doubt the propriety of
testing the very validity of future interests in terms of a conceptual distinction the tenuousness of which is attested by the countless decisions involving it. What is more important, if one concludes that the validation of vested interests and the invalidation
of contingent interests do not serve the modern objectives of the
rule-furtherance of the fluidity of property, freeing property
for risk capital purposes and the restriction of dead-hand control
of the living-then validity under the rule ought not to depend
upon whether an interest is vested or contingent. This portion
of this article will constitute an attempt to demonstrate why the
rule's concern with the concept of vesting has caused so much
litigation and to analyze the concept in terms of its relationship
to present-day purposes served by the rule.

F

•The first instalment of this article was published in the March issue (56 Mich. L.
Rev. 683-726).-Ed.
tMember of the Illinois and Wisconsin Bars; Professor of Law, Northwestern
University.-Ed.
182 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY .AND THE

DEAD HAND 68 (1955).
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A. The Concept of Vesting in General
I. " ... A Matter of History That Has Not Forgotten Lord
Coke." 183 As in the case of the rule against perpetuities itself,
the development of the concept of vesting, being a part of
the growth of the common law, has not been altogether logical.
Although it is obviously not feasible to detail here the history of
the concept of vesting, it will be of assistance to consider some
of the highlights of that history.
The term "vested" in its historical sense seems to be closely,
if not inextricably, interwoven with the concept of seisin.184 That
concept, according to mediaeval doctrine was one of "physical
possession pure and simple, which insisted that a physical livery
of seisin was necessary for a conveyance, which protected the
man seised as against all comers, including the owner. . . ."185
Had this notion of the meaning of seisin not undergone a substantial metamorphosis, it is highly improbable that the law of
future interests, and with it the learning concerning vested and
contingent remainders, could have developed as it did. However,
as Holdsworth admirably demonstrates, statutes designed to enlarge the rights of persons disseised and the development of
legal doctrine and procedural progress186 caused "seisin" to lose
at least in part the connotation of "possession" and to become
more closely associated with "ownership" and "title."187
Notwithstanding material modifications in the law as to
seisin, shades of the history of this complex abstraction188 may
even today affect the decision of concrete cases189 and it seems
clear that the feudal rule that there could be no gap in the

183 Holmes, J., in Gardner v. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603 at 605 (1918), referring to
"the law of leases" in connection with the provability of rent claims in federal bankruptcy
proceedings.
184 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsr PERPTumES, 4th ed., §971 (1942) (hereinafter cited as
GRAv): "The idea of a vested remainder ••. had its origin in the theory of seisin."
185 7 HOLDSWOR.TH, HisrOR.Y OF ENGUSH LAw 29 (1926) (hereinafter cited as HOLDS·
WOR.TH).
186 Id. at 31-81.
187 Id. at 31.
188 Id. at 56: "It [the law as to seisin and disseisin] consisted of a set of primitive
principles which had grown up round, and had been elaborated by, the working of the
real actions; these primitive principles had been reconciled with more modern ideas only
by the growth of a number of modifications, statutory and othenvise, which made the
law difficult, obscure, and complex. • . ."
189 For example, even today it is the rule in some jurisdictions that there may be no
dower in a remainder because the remainderman is not seised. SIMES AND SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTUR.E INTER.ESTS, 2d ed., §1887 (1956) (hereinafter cited as SIMES AND SMITH).
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seisin190 had a marked, if not indeed an overbearing effect on
the concept of vesting. In support of this view, it may be noted
that reversions following freehold estates of lesser quantum than
a fee simple and reversions following terms for years were valid
common law interests.191 Remainders following life estates and
freehold interests (sometimes called remainders192) following
terms were, when certain to take effect at the ending of the
preceding estate, also valid at early common law.193 Both interests
were and are regarded as "vested,"194 a term which is said to have
originated with the word "vestire" which meant to put in possession of land, i.e., to deliver the seisin.195 Considering all of these
factors together, it seems reasonable to conclude that a future
interest which was vested in the historical sense was an interest
so limited that it assured a continuity in seisin when the interest
which preceded it ended. The holder of the interest might be
actually seised before his right to possession matured, e.g., if
he had a reversion or vested "remainder" following a term; 196
or he might simply be assured of the right to seisin upon the
ending of a preceding estate, e.g., if he had a reversion or a vested
remainder following a life estate, the seisin being for the time
in the freeholder-the tenant for life.197 But at all events seisin
was certain to be continuous.
Viewed from the point of view suggested in the preceding
paragraph, the word "vested" probably had nothing to do with
the absence of contingency.198 Indeed, contingent remainders
were not recognized by the early land law, and those first sanctioned by the courts were remainders to the heirs of living person,s.199 It could only be after remainders dependent upon contingencies other than that of the death of a living person were recognized,200 with the result that remainders began to be more exten190 7 HOLDSWORTH, 84-85.
191 SIMES AND SMITH, §82.

A reversion in fee following a term is sometimes called a
present fee simple subject to a term since the seisin remains in the reversioner. Id. at 65.
192 SIMES AND SMITH, §116; 7 HOLDSWORTH, 85.
193 Jbid. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 2d ed., 21, 25
(1903).
194 GRAY, §113 ("All reversions are vested interests"); 7 HOLDSWORTH, 84-85.
195 GRAY, §100; HAWKINS, WILLS, 3d ed., 263 (1925) (hereinafter cited as HAWKINS).
196 7 HOLDSWORTH, 85; SIMES AND SMITH, §§82, 1887.
197 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 38 (1903).
198 HAWKINS, 263: "In ••• its original sense, 'vested' has no reference to the absence
of conditional-ness or contingency."
199 GRAY, §134; 7 HOLDSWORTH, 85-89; PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw, 2d ed., 502-504 (1936).
200 Holdsworth's discussion of the early history of contingent remainders (7 HOLDS·
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sively employed by conveyancers,201 that contradistinction between "vested" and "contingent" remainders became important.
And when that occurred it was not in connection with the rule
against perpetuities. Rather did the difference become significant
at first because of the principle, based on the theory that seisin
must be continuous,202 that a contingent remainder must take
effect, if at all, eo instanti upon the termination of the particular
estate of freehold that supports it203-the first and most important
facet of the rule of property which came to be known as the rule
of destructibility of contingent remainders. 204 The matter is nowhere more clearly put than in the statement of Jessel, M. R., in
Abbiss v. Burney 205 that, "The reason why a contingent remainder
under a legal devise failed, if at the death of the previous holder
of the estate of freehold there was no person who answered the
description of the remainderman next to take, was the feudal rule
that the freehold could never be vacant, for that there must always
be a tenant to render the services to the lord, and therefore if the
remainder could not take effect immediately on the determination of the prior estate, it never could take effect at all." 206

WORTH, 85-91) seems to indicate that the validity of remainders "dependent upon contingencies other than that of the death of .t,he living person" (id. at 89) was not fully
established until the decision in Colthirst v. Bejushin, 1 Plowd. 21, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1549).
201 PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 2d ed., 529 (1936): "From
the middle of the sixteenth century ... the tendency was to enlarge the class of contingent
remainders which the law would recognise, although still emphasising their destructibility." The invention of the device of appointing trustees to preserve contingent
remainders and its sanction by at least the beginning of the eighteenth century [id. at
530; Duncomb v. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437, 83 Eng. Rep. 770 (1695)], if not somewhat earlier
(7 HOLDSWORTH, 104), attests to an expanding use of contingent remainders from the
middle of the sixteenth century on.
202 7 HOLDSWORTH, 105.
203Ibid.
204 The other facet of the rule of destructibility is the rule tllat if a future interest
can possibly take effect as a remainder (as distinguished from an indestructible executory
interest) it will be regarded as a remainder. Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wms. Saund. 380, 85
Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670). That the original importance of determining whether or not a
contingent remainder existed resulted from the rule of destructibility and was not an
outgrowth of the rule against perpetuities is exemplified ·by Loddington v. Kime, 1 Salk.
224, 91 Eng. ,Rep. 198 (1695), decided only thirteen years after the Duke of Norfolk's
Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681). Long before, in Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep.
66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1599), which considerably antedates any concern with perpetuities
in the modern sense, one question was whether, for destructibility purposes, a remainder
was contingent. However, the applicability or non-applicability of the rule in Shelley's
Case, and not the vested or contingent character of the remainder, was the real issue for
decision.
205 17 Ch. 211 (1881).
206 Id. at 229. Emphasis added. For an interesting summary of competing theories
concerning the possibility that in limited instances -tlle freehold could be vacant, see 7
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The inflexibility of the rule that the freehold must never be
in abeyance obviously heightened the importance of distinguishing between vested and contingent remainders. For if a remainder
were vested it would take effect whenever and however the preceding estate ended, whether naturally or prematurely by forfeiture or merger. 207 But the law's insistence on continuous seisin
did more than that; it resulted in the very definition of at least
one type of contingent remainder being phrased in terms of whether or not the remainder was certain to take effect in possession
upon the determination of the particular estate. Thus, Fearne
classifies as a contingent remainder one, "Where the condition,
upon which the remainder is limited, is certain in event, but the
determination of the particular estate may happen before it .
208
• • •"
So, if property is given to A for life, remainder to B after
the death of C, or to A for 21 years if he shall so long live, and
after his death to B, the remainder in each instance is limited to
take effect upon an event certain to occur, but it is in each instance treated as contingent.209 Hence it appears that the contingent character of the remainder was not necessarily dependent
upon its being created in terms of "contingency" as we would
today understand that word, but upon the uncertainty of its becoming possessory when the particular estate ended.
From the foregoing discussion one might conclude that, after
it became important to distinguish between vested and contingent remainders, a remainder was vested if it met Gray's specification that throughout its continuance the remainderman and his
heirs had the right to immediate possession, whenever and however the preceding estate might determine; 210 it was contingent
not only if limited to take effect upon an uncertain event, but
also, even though limited to take effect upon the happening of
an event certain to occur, if it was not certain to take effect in
possession when the preceding estate of freehold ended. OtherHOLDSWORTH, 86: "Littleton .•. .had admitted that, in ,the case of the death of a parson
[who held land in right of his churoh], and during the vacancy of a living, even the
freehold could be in abeyance."
201 GRAY, §101. Vested remainders following estates tail were an exception and were
destructible. Id., §973.
208 1 FURNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES, 3d ed., 4 (1776).
209 Id. at 5-6. But if there is a gift to A for 80 years if he shall so long live, and
after his death to B, the remainder is vested because it is assumed that A will not overlive
the term. Id. at 11-12; SIMES AND SMITH, §116 at 105-107, discussing Napper v. Sanders,
Hut. 118, 123 Eng. Rep. 1142 (1632), and other leading English cases.
210 GRAY, §101.
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wise put, a remainder was vested if continuity of seisin was assured;
it was contingent if it was not certain that seisin would flow
without interruption from the holder of an antecedent estate of
freehold directly to tlie remainderman. That seisin could as well
flow, without any gap, from the holder of a particular estate to
a reversioner and thence to a contingent remainderman (an
acceptable concept) seems not to have occurred to the early conveyancers.211 A complete circuity of reasoning212 is avoided by
this refusal to admit that a reversioner may be temporarily seised
and thus supply the necessary continuity.
The early distinctions between vested and contingent remainders assuredly involved fictions and abstractions, but these are as
important to growth in law as are unproven hypotheses to the
expansion of scientific knowledge. In each case, the process of
trial and error and ultimate proof of utility impart reality to what
in the beginning was essentially in large measure an assumption.
However, just as a scientific hypothesis must be discarded when
it is disproved or when its utility is spent, so must a legal fiction
be rejected when it ceases to serve a rational purpose. The original purpose of distinguishing between vested and contingent remainders, i.e., the assurance of continuous seisin, vanished with
the Statute of Uses213 and the abolition of the feudal burdens.214
Whether the distinction between vested and contingent interests
_ as developed and refined in connection with its original and other
purposes serves a sensible objective in connection with a modern
rule against perpetuities remains to be investigated.
2. Refinements and .Transmutations. All too often it is not
recognized that the term "vested" and what is commonly regarded
as its antonym, the term "contingent," are used in several senses.
As has been seen, a future interest in land was vested in the feudal

211 This may have been the result of the notion that seisin could not be altered
without livery of seisin being made. But it was of course altered without livery when it
passed from Ii~ tenant to remainderman. This conceptual difficulty was overcome by the
theory that seisin was given "to the particular tenant, which seisin was held to enure
to the benefit of the remainderman." PLUCKNE'IT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
I.Aw, 2d ed., 504 (1936). It would not have been a long step to say that when livery of
seisin was made it would inure to the temporary benefit of the reversioner pending a
determination of whether or not the contingent remainderman would ever take.
212 Cf. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH I.Aw, 2d ed., 31 (1903):
" .•• a man has an action of trespass because he has possession, .•• he has possession
because he has an action of trespass.••• All the while, however, our law of possession
and trespass is being more perfectly defined. Its course is not circular but spiral.••."
213 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536).
214 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660).
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sense when, according to the rules of the common law as they
existed prior to the Statute of Uses, seisin in the holder of the
future interest was certain instantaneously to follow the ending
of an anterior estate in possession. If the future interest did not
meet that requirement it was contingent.215 In this view, all executory interests are contingent, for they are non-common law interests and, although the Statute of Uses made possible the
shifting of seisin without livery of seisin, it could not supply
continuity of seisin in the common law sense, even in respect
to an executory interest which was absolutely certain at some
time to take effect.216 Yet, so eminent an authority as Fearne,
in dividing "vested estates" into "estates vested in possession" and
"estates vested in interest," classifies in the latter category "such
Executory Devises ... as are not ... made to depend on a period
or event that is uncertain.217 And although Gray took the position
that executory devises "are not vested interests until they take
effect in possession ... ," 218 he admitted that an executory devise
which is certain to become vested "cannot be called contingent;
but neither is it vested. " 219
Professor Simes says that such an interest is "neither contingent nor vested," but he sees "no good reason why it should be
subject to the rule." 220 He recognizes that an executory interest
certain to take effect is not vested in the feudal sense,221 but he at
least impliedly classifies it as "vested for purposes of the rule"
when he says that the rule's requirement of vesting "means that
the future interest must be certain to be subject to no condition
precedent after the expiration of lives in being and twenty-one
years." 222 Fearne's classification of "vested estates" and Professor
Simes' approach may be said to illustrate at least one important
transmutation of the contrast between vested and contingent
interests in terms of the application of the rule against perpetuities. Not only is a feudally vested interest not offensive to the rule,
but it seems also that an interest certain to become possessory,
215 HAWKINS, 263-264.
216 GRAY, §114; MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE AGAINsr PERPETUITIES 1 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MORRIS AND I.EACH); SIMES AND SMITH, §1236.
217 1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES, 4th ed., Introduction,

1 (1791).
218 GRAY, §114.
219Ibid.
220 SIMES AND SMITH,
221 Id., §1236.
222 Id., §1232.

§1232.
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even if not feudally vested, meets the rule's requirement of vesting. The word "contingent" acquires a new meaning too; it still
means any non-feudally-vested common law interest and it means
in additon an interest the taking effect of which is subject to "any
unfulfilled condition precedent."223
The words "vested" and "contingent" have still other meanings. Thus, with regard to legacies of personal property, it is
stated by Hawkins that, "The rules and expressions relative to
vesting . . . have been derived in great measure from the
civil law."224 Legacies "payable at a future time certain to arrive"225 were transmissible in the sense that the personal representative of the legatee would take the property if the legatee died
before the time of payment. Legacies "payable on any event which
might never happen226 were not transmissible in that sense; they
were, in modem terminology, contingent on survivorship. But
the authorities, both English and American, recognize that an
interest may be contingent and yet "non-contingent on survivorship," as, for example, a gift to A if B goes to Rome. 227 Such an
interest, though "vested" urider Anglo-American decisions in the
one sense of being "transmissible," would not have been vested
(unconditional and transmissible) under the civil law, and it
is not vested in the feudal sense nor in the more modem sense
of the word of being subject to no condition precedent. And of
course a gift which is contingent on survivorship, e.g., to such
of A's children as are living at his death, can never be transmissible or vested in any sense until the requirement of survivorship
is .met.
From the preceding paragraph, it must be apparent that a
determination that an interest is transmissible does not necessarily (though it may) mean that it cannot violate the common
law rule against perpetuities. But it does not follow that an apparently non-transmissible interest is always contingent within the
meaning of the rule, because, as the concept of vesting became
more refined, interests which were vested-to-be-divested came to
be recognized. So if property is given to A for life, remainder to
B in fee, but if B dies before A, then to C in fee, B's remainder,
223 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
OF PROPERTY).
224 HAWKINS, 264.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.

221 Id. at

265.

§21.5 (1952) (hereinafter cited as

AMERICAN

LAw

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

895

though in a practical sense as contingent as one given to B if he
is living at A's death, is vested to be divested according to the
view most commonly taken by courts.228 Here, obviously, no perpetuity question could arise. Suppose, however, a gift to the firstborn son of A (A having no son at the time of the gift) if such
son reaches the age of 50, and if he dies under that age then to a
charitable corporation. In this case, the gift to the son is apparently contingent not only on his birth, but it is also apparently
contingent on his reaching 50, and non-transmissible if he dies
before reaching that age. Thus it would seem at first blush to
violate the rule against perpetuities. However, many courts would
say that the gift over, being a "clause of divestiture," causes the
gift to A's first-born son to vest at birth.229 Since the gift over to
charity is clearly too remote, it is void, and the prior gift to A's
first-born son would probably become absolute. 230 The vested-tobe-divested concept thus changes an otherwise non-transmissible,
contingent and remote interest into an interest which is transmissible, vested and inoffensive to the rule.
In connection with the various meanings of "vested" and
"contingent" which are illustrated by the foregoing discussion,
Professor Leach aptly observes that "in the intricate and borderline cases ... [the] significance [of these terms] may be obscure
and an unconscious transition may be made from one meaning
to another." 231 Then, with uncharacteristic despair, he goes on
to say, "It is useless now to assert that a terminology more descriptive and less confusing could have been adopted, for the
multiple use of these terms is now established practice."232 With
more sanguinity, he concludes, "It remains only to separate and
define . . . [the] meanings [of "vested" and "contingent"] in
order that analysis may not be confounded by nomenclature."238
With the utmost deference, it is submitted that Professor Leach
falls short of achieving this worthy objective when, after indicating that the word "vested" may refer to a possessory interest, an

228 See, for example, Baley v. Strahan, 314 Ill. 213, 145 N.E. 359 (1924). And see 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.31 at 177; GRAY, §102; SIMES AND SMITH, §149 at 160.
229 T-his is the rule of Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132, 83 Eng. Rep. 614 (1683),
discussed in 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 1364-1373 (1951) (hereinafter cited as JARMAN).
230 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.48; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §176 (1941); id., §176 (Supp. 1954) (hereinafter cited as CAREY AND
SCHUYLER); SIMES AND SMITH, §§825-828.
231 LEACH, CAsES ON FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., 255 (1940).
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
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interest vested in the feudal sense and to transmissible interests,
he defines an interest as vested for purposes of the rule against
perpetuities as one which "has acquired the degree of certainty
which under the Rule an interest must acquire within lives in
being and twenty-one years or fail." 234 Professor Leach would
probably be the first to agree that his definition depends for any
real content upon the interpolation into it of the great body of
case law dealing with vested and contingent interests. That some
substance may be imparted to it by resort to constructional rules
developed through litigation there is no doubt, and to the extent
that this is so the definition is valid: We have already seen, however, that "vested" and "contingent" had a metaphysical beginning, that they now have several meanings and that even these
have their shadings, one of which is often con~sed with another
even by sophisticated students of future interests. It is therefore
not surprising that we shall find that, despite supposedly well settled rules of construction relevant to the terms in question, it is no
simple matter to avoid being "confounded by nomenclature" in
determining whether a future interest has acquired the degree
of certainty which the law requires within the time the law allows.
B. The Concept of Vesting in Particular

A particularized analysis of the concept of vesting necessarily
entails an examination of the rules which have been evolved by
courts in their efforts to determine whether a given interest is
vested or contingent. An intelligent evaluation of these rules
presupposes a recognition of the several meanings, already discussed, implicit in the terms "vested" and "contingent." Thus a
rule of construction may in its origin have been helpful to a decision that an interest is vested in the feudal sense and the same rule
may have no logical application in a case where the question is
whether a future interest is contingent on survivorship. Very few
courts, however, have recognized this and most have assumed that
constructional rules concerning the terms in question are indiscriminately applicable regardless of the issue to be decided. As a
consequence, the same rules have been used whether feudal vesting, transmissibility or a possible violation of the rule against perpetuities was the point in controversy.
Account should also be taken of the fact that the rules distinguishing between the vested or contingent character of a future
234

Id. at 256.

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

897

interest are rules of construction and not rules of property. They
are thus designed as an aid to ascertaining intention-actual, presumed, inferred or supposed. Since most of these rules tend
toward the conclusion that future interests are vested it is arguable that they are bound to further intention in perpe~uity cases
because they tend to save gifts from destruction. In a sense this
may be true, but it is equally true that no rule of construction
which lacks a rational relationship to a rule of property ought
ever to be determinative of the application or non-application
of the rule of property. Accordingly, although rules of construction concerning "vesting" and "contingency" can probably never
be eliminated in instances where the transmissibility of a future
interest is involved, such rules can be sensibly appraised for
purposes of the rule against perpetuities only in terms of present-day justifications for the rule itself. It is from this point of
view that the major constructional rules in respect to vested and
contingent interests will be approached. Rules concerning land
and personalty will not be segregated since the tendency has been
to fuse the two to a point where they are virtually indistinguishable.
I. The Rule That the Law Favors the Early Vesting of
Estates. The rule of early vesting, that "the law favors the early
vesting of estates," is as deeply imbedded in the law of property as
any other rule of construction.235 This rule has been examined in
detail by the writer in an earlier article.236 There is of course no
need to retrace here the ground there covered, but a summary
of the conclusions reached may be helpful.
The rule of early vesting appears to have arisen as a constructional device to ameliorate the rigors of a rule of property, i.e., the
rule of destructibility of contingent remainders.237 Viewed in this

235 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.3; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §292; 2 JARMAN 1346,
1386; SIMES AND SMITH, §573.
236 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting,"
46 Iu.. L. REV. 407 (1951). The soundness of the rule has been doubted by others. 5
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.3 at 130: " ... [C]ontinued adherence to this preference
[for early vesting] in modem times is at least of doubtful validity in many situations."
LEACH, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., 257, n. 3 (1940): "Is it possible that (apart
from perpetuities cases, where a vested construction tends to save the gift) the preference
for vested interests .•. has no foundation at all at t-he present time?"
237 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting,"
46 Iu.. L. REv. 407 at 408-412 (1951); KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §329 (1920). And
see Doe d. Long v. Prigg, 8 B. & C. 231 at 236-237, 108 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1828): "The law
inclines to such a construction as will tend to vest a remainder ••• because contingent
remainders are in the power of ,the particular tenant, and may be destroyed. • • ."
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light, the rule in its origin was no doubt concerned with feudal
vesting and not with the other meanings, hereinbefore discussed,
which the term vesting has come to comprehend. Thus it may
be said that in those jurisdictions where the rule of destructibility
has been judicially or legislatively abolished238 the rule of early
vesting no longer performs the function for which it was designed.
One could almost stop there had the rule of early vesting remained no more than a rule fashioned to further feudal vesting,
for had that been the case the rule would be almost wholly
wanting in virility at least in those jurisdictions where contingent
remainders are no longer perishable commodities.
Like many other constructional rules, however, the rule that
the law favors the early vesting of estates has been allowed to
spread into areas with which it was not at first concerned. As
"vested" and "contingent" acquired new meanings, a rule in
the beginning directed at feudal vesting came to be applied in
cases when feudal vesting or the lack of it is not the problem at
all. So the law is said to favor the early vesting of estates where
the question is whether an interest is transmissible (vested) or
subject to the condition precedent of survivorship (contingent).239
Thus applied, the rule has been rationalized as furthering the
fluidity of property240 and as implementing the presumption
against intestacy.241 But it may be doubted that early vesting,
however the term is used, makes property more marketable.2 ~
And even if early vesting sometimes prevents intestacy when
"vested" means "non-contingent on survivorship," it is by no
means clear that the strong aversion of courts to intestacy always
furthers intention.243 Moreover, it is plain indeed that the rule
of early vesting often positively defeats intention by casting
property to strangers,244 by making it available to creditors of

238 Judicial and legislative encroachments on the rule of destructibility are summarized
in Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting," 46
ILL. L. R.Ev. 407 at 412-416 (1951).
239 SIMES AND SMITH, §573.
240 Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill. 482 at 487, 81 N:E. (2d) 192 (1948): "The reason for
favoring vested . . . estates . . . is to . . . permit and promote alienation. • • ."
241 Peard v. Kekewich, 15 Beav. 166 at 172, 51 Eng. Rep. 500 (1852); Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Park, 307 Mass. 255 at 261, 29 N.E. (2d) 977 (1940).
242 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting,"
46 ILL. L. REv. 407 at 424-427 (1951).
243 Id. at 421-424.
244See, for example, DeKorwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, (N.D. Ill. 1949) 84
F. Supp. 918, revd. on other grounds (7th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 347, where, as a result
of the application of the rule of early vesting, the second wife of the testator's son-in-law
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the objects of a testator's bounty245 and by creating federal estate
tax problems where none would exist had a presumption of
contingency prevailed.246
It should nevertheless be observed that, whatever criticisms
may be offered against the rule of early vesting, the rule does
indeed further intention to the extent that may help to remove
future interests from the operative sphere of the rule against
perpetuities. No one except a whimsical testator would knowingly make a gift which is void. Be it noted, however, that the
same may be said of every other rule of construction to be considered here, and that the question here is not whether a rule
of construction makes sense because it mollifies the rule against
perpetuities. The question is whether it makes sense that the
rule should apply to remoteness of vesting alone, and part of
the answer to that question depends upon whether, apart from
the rule against perpetuities, the rules relating to vesting afford
valid guideposts to the ascertainment or reasonable imputation
of intention. It would be hard to say that the maxim that the
law favors the early vesting of estates sheds any light whatever
on intention.
2. The Rule That Expressions as to Future Vesting Do Not
Necessarily Render an Interest Contingent. It is well settled
that a remainder limited to take effect "at," "after," or "upon"
the death of a tenant for life is vested notwithstanding the fact
that words which could be regarded as words of futurity are
annexed to the gift.247 The strong tendency to attach the label
"vested" to future interests has led courts to go much further in
disregarding words of futurity. So where words apparently importing the necessity of survivorship have been employed, it is
frequently held that vesting is not thereby deferred,248 the words
of apparent contingency having reference to the time of possession
merely, as for instance where property was devised upon trust
to apply the rents toward the maintenance of the testator's
daughter until she should attain 25 and from and after her

shared in his estate. The case is discussed in Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting," 46 ILL. L. REV. 407 at 428-430 (1951).
245 Id. at 430-432.
246 Id. at 432-436.
247 SIMES AND SMITH, §§144, 585.
248 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

et seq.

.
§21.9;

CAREY AND SCHUYLER,

§295; 2

JARMAN,

1360
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attaining that age upon trust for the daughter.249 And this approach has been carried to the extreme point where, for example,
future interests expressly stated to be contingent on survivorship
have been held to be vested. Thus, in Chapman v. Cheney 250
the Illinois Supreme Court held vested and valid for purposes
of the rule against perpetuities a gift to the testator's grandchildren which provided that, "No such grandchild shall acquire
or be vested with an interest or any estate of inheritance in any
part of my said real or personal estate unless such grandchild
shall live to reach the age of thirty years."
In cases involving remainder interests expectant upon the
determination of a prior life estate it would be difficult from a
historical standpoint to conclude that words such as "at," "after,"
or "upon" the death of the tenant for life, introducing the
gift in remainder, should cause the remainder to be contingent.
For here the requirements of feudal vesting are met; continuity
of seisin is assured unless a premature termination of the life
estate is supposed and unless the introductory words are read
to mean that the remainderman must literally survive the life
tenant. Where, however, the willingness to ignore words which
might be regarded as importing contingency is broadened into
a positive proclivity to distort the normal meaning of words
which are repugnant to a finding of vesting, it is not easy to
conclude that intention is given effect-unless of course by intention is meant what a court thinks a testator would have done
if he had known the consequences of what he did do. Otherwise
st~ted, the rule that words importing contingency may be ignored,
when carried to the point that it sometimes has been, becomes
a source of confusion rather than an aid in determining the
meaning of an instrument of gift. Support for this position may
be found in the fact that the same court which decided Chapman·
v. Cheney 251 has on other occasions thought that vesting should
be deferred because of expressions as to future vesting far less
equivocal than those there construed.252

249 Doe d. Cadogan v. Ewart, 7 Ad. & El. 636, 112 Eng. Rep. 609 (1838).
250 191 Ill. 574, 61 N.E. 363 (1901). And see Estate of Welch, 83 Cal. App. (2d) 391
at 395, 188 P. (2d) 797 (1948) (gift in trust for grandson who was to "have no vested right
in the net income or principal of said trust estate until he shall have attained the age
of twenty-five years" held not contingent on survivorship).
251191 Ill. 574, 61 N.E. 363 (1901).
252 CAREY AND ScH_UYLER, §295 at 404; id. (Supp. 1954), §295.
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3. The Rule of Boraston's Ca5e. In Boraston's Case2 :;a there
was a devise of an eight-year term to T. A. and his wife and "after
the term of the said eight years, the said . . . [land] to remain to
my executors, until such time as Hugh Boraston shall accomplish
his full age of twenty-one years, and the mean profit to be employed by my executors towards the performance of this my . . .
will.... And when the said Hugh cometh unto twenty-one years
of age, then I will that he shall enjoy the ... [land] to him and
his heirs forever." Hugh died when he was about nine years
old and in an action of ejectment against Hugh's heir it was
held that the defendant should prevail. Hugh thus took an
interest which was vested in the sense of being transmissible or
non-contingent on survivorship. Despite the fact that Hugh's
interest was created by will and hence probably an executory
devise,254 the court's characterization of the interest as a "remainder" seems also to support the view that it was thought
to be vested in the feudal sense, as in the case of a freehold
subject to a term. Out of Boraston's Case is derived the rule
that, "where a testator devises lands to trustees until A shall
attain the age of twenty-one years [or any given age], and if
or when he shall attain that age, then to him in fee, this is construed as conferring on A a vested estate in fee simple ... though
it is quite clear that a devise to A, if or when he shall attain the
age of twenty-one years, standing isolated and detached from the
context, would confer a contingent interest only."255 The rule,
as do most of those under discussion, appears to apply to realty
and personalty alike.256
Since the word "if" does not appear in the devise in Boraston's
Case and since, despite expressions to the contrary,257 "if" seems

253 3 Co. Rep. 16a at 17b, 76 Eng. Rep. 664 (1587).
254 GRAY, §138, n. 5. And see CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §296 at 408-409. But see 2
JARMAN, 1362, where it is stated that the executors had, " . . . a prior interest extending

over the whole period for which the devise in question .•• [was] postponed." Professor
Simes, in correspondence with the writer, comments on Jarman's views as follows: "The
only way I could see it could ·be called a chattel interest would be to rewrite it as a term
of years depending upon the number of years Hugh would have to live before attaining
the age of 21. For example, if he would have to live 15 years, the term could be 15 years
or so long as he does not attain 21, a term of years with a special limitation. I suppose
you could also say that the executors are given a life estate with a special limitation,
that is, to the executors for the life of Hugh or so long as he does not attain the age
of 21. Both of these constructions are decidedly forced . . . •"
255 2 JARMAN, 1360-1361.
256 Id. at 1388; SIMES AND SMITH, §574.
257 Hanson v. Graham, 6 Ves. Jr. 239 at 246, 31 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1801): "Then why
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clearly to import contingency to a far greater degree than
"when," it is difficult to see how the case can be said to sustain a
rule as broad as that stated at the end of the preceding paragraph.
Indeed, the actual holding of the case is not easy to justify on
any logical ground. It may of course be urged that the direction
that Hugh "shall enjoy" the property at 21 was indicative of an
intent that possession only should be postponed.258 It has also
been suggested that the testator postponed possession "primarily
for the purpose of making other dispositions of his property
to other persons and not because he did not regard it as an
immediate gift,"259 but this reasoning fails to take account of
the express direction that the executors were to hold the property
until Hugh reached 21 and no longer, regardless of the status
of "the performance of ... [testator's] will." The truth is that
the so-called rule in Boraston's Case can be supported only in
historical perspective and even the decision itself can be rationalized only in terms of a strong antipathy to a suspension of feudal
vesting (at a time when the executory devise was not fully developed260) which would have resulted in an intestacy. It may
as a result be observed that Boraston's Case and the rule which
is said to be an outgrowth of it afford an invaluable illustration
of the complexities and illogicalities inherent in the concept of
vesting.
4. The Rule That a Gift Distributable in the Future Will Be
Considered Vested if Words of Immediate Gift Are Used. Where
there is a gift, usually of personalty, to A, "when" or "as" he
shall attain, or "from and after" his attaining, a given age, or
upon the happening of some other event, the gift is said to be
prima facie contingent.261 However, it was decided at a very early
date that the postponement of payment alone does not prevent
a gift from being vested if the gift is phrased in terms of an immediate gift distinct from the directions as to payment.262 So,
in Clobberie's Case,263 where there was a bequest to A, at her age
of 21 years or day of marriage, to be paid to her with interest,
should we refine upon a refinement by . . . iholding . . . that the word 'when' standing
by itself does not import condition •.•." Sir William Grant, M. R.

258 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §296 at 409.
259 SIMES AND SMITH, §586 at 35.
260 GRAY, §138.
2615 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.17; HAWKINS, 266.
2625 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.18; HAWKINS, 268.
263 2 Vent. 342, 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (1677).
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the money was said to pass to A's executor though she died under
21 without having married. The formula is that, "if futurity is
annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended;
but if it appears to relate to the time of payment only, the legacy
vests instanter."264
It is obvious that, "A bequest to A at twenty-one, and a bequest to A payable at twenty-one, do not much differ in expression."265 Yet the distinction, such as it is, drawn between the two
in Clobberie's Case has been fully accepted in England266 and
in this country, 267 and the notion that vesting will be accelerated
by words of immediate gift is said to apply not only to legacies
but also to gifts of land.268 The rule has also been invoked in
cases involving the transmissibility269 and validity under the rule
against perpetuities270 of gifts in trust. It may be observed that
there is more sense to this rule than is the case in connection with
many of the other rules of construction concerning vesting, since
an immediate gift, unequivocally made, can logically be regarded
as conferring an immediate interest on the object of the gift.271
The difficulty of course arises in determining what words will
be deemed to constitute an immediate gift. This should be obvious from the refined distinction which was drawn in Clobberie's
Case itself.272
5. The Rule That Vesting Will Not Be Deferred Where
Distribution Is Postponed for the Convenience of the Estate.
Jarman states that, "where the only gift is in the direction to
pay or distribute at a future age, the case is not to be ranked with
264 2 JARMAN, 1388.
265 HAWKINS, 268.
266 2 JARMAN, 1388-1390.
267 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.18.
268 3 PROPERTY R.EsTATEMENT §257, comment f (1940).
269 Chaffers v. Abell, 3 Jur. 577 (1839). And see In re

Bartholomew's Trusts, 1 Mac.

&: G. 354, 41 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1849).

Howe v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252, 38 N.E. 1083 (1894).
course to a contrary expression of intention. 2 JARMAN, 13901391. And it does not apply if payment is deferred until the occurrence of an event which
may or may not happen. Atkins v. Hiccocks, 1 Atk. 500, 26 Eng. Rep. 316 (1737) (gift
payable on marriage). But see Booth v. Booth, 4 Ves. Jr. 399, 31 Eng. Rep. 203 (1799)
(residuary gift payable on marriage). The English rule that a legacy charged on land
will sink if the legatee fails to reach the age at which payment is to be made was subject
to numerous exceptions (HAWKINS, 279-282; 2 JARMAN, 1382-1386) and does not appear
to have gained much vogue in this country. 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.18 at 154.
272 SIMES AND SMITH, §586 at 32: "It seems absurd to make a distinction between the
use of the words 'to be paid' at a given age and merely 'at' a given age. Rather the rule
should ,be to determine from all the language whether it appears to be an immediate gift
with possession postponed or a gift on a condition precedent of surviving the named age."
210

271 The rule yields of
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those in which the payment or distribution only is deferred,
but is one in which time is of the essence of the gift."273 This
rule of construction has been incorporated into American law
under the label of the "divide-and-pay-over" rule.274 It has been
criticized on the grounds that the "reasoning in support of the
rule has rarely been either explicit or very convincing," and that
"courts commonly content themselves with the observation that
futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift and not merely
to the time of enjoyment, without attempting to demonstrate
why it is that from this fact it should be inferred that the transferor intended to make survival to the time of enjoyment in
possession a condition precedent."275 The same authorities suggest that the rule is fast disappearing from American law.276 This
conclusion may be correct if it means only that the "divide-andpay-over" rule is, eo nomine, no longer of as much significance
as has been the case in the past. But if the suggestion is that there
is no presumption of contingency in respect of a gift distributable
in the future, then it must be viewed with caution. Most of the
rules of construction relating to vesting operate to make vested
an interest which would otherwise be contingent; and in most
cases the interest would otherwise be contingent because property
has been directed to be distributed at a future time. This may
appear to be contrary to the maxim that the law favors the early
vesting of estates, but the fact remains that favoritism for vesting
alone is seldom sufficient to overcome the apparently prima fade
contingent character of a gift distributable in the future.
It may be that a major reason for the doubtful reputation of
the divide-and-pay-over rule is the exception to it which is the
subject matter of this subdivision. As indicated in the heading,
the formula is that even though there is no gift except in a direction to distribute in the future, the gift is nevertheless vested
if "payment or distribution appear to be postponed for the convenience of the fund or property. . . ." 277 If, by "convenience of
the fund" is meant "to let in a prior estate" (e.g., where following an equitable life estate in A there is a direction to the trustees
to pay and ~ivide the subject matter of a gift to B and C), the
273 2 JARMAN, 1391.
274 See especially Matter

of Crane, 164 N.Y. 71 at 76-77, 58 N.E. 47 (1900). The rule
is discussed in 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.21; SIMES AND SMITH, §§657 to 658.
275 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.21 at 159-160.
276 Id. at 161-162; SIMES AND SMITH, §657 at 121.
277 2 JARMAN, 1392.
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formula could almost always be invoked to avoid a suspension
of vesting because most future dispositions are subject to one
or more anterior estates.278 If, on the other hand, "convenience
of the fund" is literally read, the formula becomes little more
than a recondite device to expedite vesting, for the "exception
is so vague as to make its application in the vast majority of cases
a matter of judicial discretion." 279 Of course, if it appears that
distribution is deferred to permit the sale of a particular asset
or the orderly liquidation of an estate, one might say that the
"convenience of the estate" is involved. Generally speaking, however, the rule under discussion is useless in the decision of a
concrete case and it certainly affords no guide whatever to the
intention, in regard to vesting, of the maker of a gift.
6. The Rule That a Gift of the Whole Income From a Gift
Which Might Otherwise Be Contingent Will Cause the Gift To
Be Vested. Where a gift distributable in the future might otherwise be contingent on survivorship, it is a well-established rule
of construction that a gift of all of the intermediate income to
the one or ones ultimately designated to take causes the gift of
the principal to vest, 280 unless of course the gift is expressly made
contingent on survivorship.281 So, a gift to A, when or if he attains
21, the entire income to be paid to him in the meanwhile, will
pass to A's estate if he dies under 21.282 And the same is true where
the gift is to a class, as in the case of a gift in trust to pay the income to the children of A until the youngest reaches 21 and
then to divide the corpus of the trust among said children.283
In England the rule has been considerably refined. It appears,
for example, that, if the rule is to apply there, all of the intermediate income must be given during the whole period antecedent to distribution,284 that a gift of the whole income for purposes of the maintenance of the beneficiary is the equivalent of
278 5 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY, §21.21 at 160.
279 SIMES AND SMITH, §658 at 127.
280 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.20; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§324-331; HAWKINS,
270-275; 2 JARMAN, 1394-1407; SI?,1ES AND SMITH, §588.
281 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §331; 2 JARMAN, 1405.
282 Lane v. Goudge, 9 Ves. 226, 32 ·Eng. Rep. 589 (1803).
283 Re Grove's Trusts, 3 Giff. 575, 66 Eng. Rep. 537 (1862).
284 2 JARMAN, 1404-1405. But in Davies v. Fisher, 5 Beav. 201, 49 Eng. Rep. 554

(1842), where there was a gift in trust for the children of A as they severally attained
25, the income to be applied for their maintenance during their minorities, the court
held .the gift vested, Lord Langdale, M. R., saying that a gift of income after minority was
to be implied. And a gift of all of the income subject to a charge apparently satisfies
the requirement that all the income be given. HAWKINS, 272.
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a direct gift of the income,285 that the rule applies where the gift
is to a class as well as where it is to an individual,286 and that a
direction to accumulate is not, for purposes of the rule, the
equivalent of a gift of income.287 The English cases also establish
that where a gift to a class is involved and the income is given for
the maintenance of the class as a whole, the income gift will
not accelerate vesting. In other words, there must be a direction
that an aliquot share of the income shall be devoted to the maintenance of each member of the class.288 Moreover, where an income gift is for maintenance, all of the income must be given
for that purpose,289 subject to the exception laid down by Jessel,
M. R., in Fox v. Fox 290 that a direction to apply all of the income
from the presumptive share of each member of a class for his
or her maintenance, "or so much thereof respectively as the trustees . . . might think proper . . . , " is sufficient to prevent a deferment of vesting. But the view of the learned Master of the Rolls
that this should be treated "as a gift of the whole income followed by a discretion to apply less than the whole ..." has been
questioned.291
Although the effect of a gift of intermediate income upon
the vesting of the ultimate gift of principal may not have been
refined by American courts to the degree that it has been in
England, it is clear that the rule under discussion has
been widely accepted in this country.292 The requirement that all
of the income be given to or for the maintenance of the ultimate
takers has not been rigidly enforced by all American courts,2113
but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, in a now very

285 Hoath v. Hoath, 2 B.C.C. 3, 29 Eng. Rep. 2 (1785); Hanson v. Graham, 6 Ves.
Jr. 239, 31 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1801).
286 Re Grove's Trusts, 3 Giff. 575, 66 ·Eng. Rep. 537 (1862). See also Jones v.
Mackilwain, I Russ. 220, 38 'Eng. Rep. 86 (1825), where, however, the gift was a residuary
one.
287 HAWKINS, 274-275; 2 JARMAN, 1406.
288 In re Parker, 16 Ch. Div. 44 (1880); In re Mervin, [1891] 3 Ch. 197.
289 Watson v. Hayes, 5 My. & Cr. 125 at 133, 41 Eng. Rep. 319 (1839); HAWKINS, 272;
2 JARMAN, 1397.
290 L. R. 19 Eq. 286 (1875).
291 In re Grimshaw's Trusts, 11 Ch. Div. 406 at 410 (1879), per Hall, V. C.; In re
Wintle, [1896] 2 Ch. 711, per North, J.; 2 JARMAN, 1401: "It is ••. somewhat difficult to
say :how far the authority of Fox v. Fox extends. It is certain that it has its limitations."
But see In re Tumey, [1899] 2 Ch. 739; In re Williams, [1907] I Ch. 180; In re Hume,
[1912] I Ch. 693; In re Woolf, [1920] I Ch. 184; In re Ussher, [1922] 2 Ch. 321.
292 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.20; CAREY AND SCHuYLER, §§324-331; SIMES
AND SMITH, §588.
293 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.20 at 158-159; SIMES AND SMITH, §588 at 38-39.
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well known case,294 that the vesting of a gift to a class will not be
accomplished by a gift of intermediate income distributable in
proportions which differ from those in which the capital is to be
distributed. There the principal was distributable per capita, the
income per stirpes, among the testator's grandchildren.
Jarman has rationalized the effect of an income gift upon vesting with the statement that, "A gift of interest, eo nomine, obviously is difficult to be reconciled with the suspension of the vesting, because interest is a premium or compensation for the forbearance of principal, to which it supposes a title... .''295 This of
course overlooks the fact that the beneficiary of a gift is an object
of the testator's bounty ~nd as such is not in a position to be forbearing in his demands for that which is or will be his only
through the testator's grace. It also fails to take adequate account
of the fact that interest and principal are perfectly capable of
separate disposition. 296 Further, it will be noted that Jarman's
statement refers to a gift of interest as such, whereas there is no
indication that the rule in question does not apply with equal
force where the gift of intermediate income is phrased in terms of
a gift of "income" without any reference whatever to "interest."
Other reasons advanced in support of the inference of vesting
supposed to arise from a gift of intermediate income are phrased
in terms of the maker of the gift thinking of income and principal
as one297 and that "the testator intended the legatee or devisee to
take some benefit from the gift of the principal immediately on the
testator's death, and that the postponement of possession was
merely for the benefit of the donee." 298 These have their appeal,
but neither they nor Jarman's nor any other explanation can
qualify as a wholly successful attempt to make this rule of construction conform to reason. Of course it by no means follows
that the rule should be rejected when the question is whether a
future interest is contingent on survivorship. Once again, however, one is justified in wondering whether validity or invalidity
under the rule against perpetuities should be made to depend

294 Kountz's Estate (No.
295 2 JARMAN, 1397.

1), 213 Pa. 390, 62 A. 1103 (1906).

296See Batsford v. Kebbell, 3 Ves. Jr. 363, 30 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1797), which, though
much criticized [e.g., In re Wrey, 30 Ch. Div. 507 at 510 (1885), per Kay, J.], has been said
to tum "on the marked distinction which was drawn between the dividends and the
capital." 2 JARMAN, 1396.
297 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.20 at 158.
298 SIMES AND SMITH, §588 at 37-38.
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upon the application or non-application of a rule of construction
which is largely lacking in logical foundation. That is exactly
what happens in connection with the rule as to the effect of an
intermediate income gift, for it is applied indiscriminately in determining whether future interests are vested in the sense of being non-contingent on survivorship or whether they are vested for
purposes of the rule against perpetuities.299
7. The Rule That a Direction To Sever a Gift From the Bulk
of the Estate Causes the Gift To Vest Even Though It Might
Otherwise Be Contingent. The famous English case, Saunders v.
Vautier., 300 dealt with a gift of stock in trust to accumulate all of
the income until the beneficiary should attain 25 and then to distribute to him the stock and all accumulated income. The beneficiary, upon reaching 21, was held entitled to have the stock
transferred to him on the ground that he had an indefeasibly
vested interest therein. The case is said to establish the rule that
a legacy is vested where there is a mandate that it be severed from
the bulk of the estate. In a later case, In re Lord Nunburnholme.,301 a gift of shares of stock in trust to be delivered to the
testator's son when he attained 26 was held to be contingent on
survivorship. There the income from the stock up to £3,000 per
year was payable to the son and the balance was to be accumulated, but the incG>me was subject to a contingent charge in favor
of the testator's daughters. It was said that in order for a severance to be directed within the meaning of the rule under discussion no one except the beneficiary may have any interest at all
in the gift.302 In Festing v. Allen303 appears the added qualification
that the· gift must be one in trust or one with respect to which a
segregation is directed; it is not enough that severance results from
some extraneous factor, "as in the case of the residue becoming
payable before the legacy itself is payable."304

299 For example, the rule against perpetuities and the rule of construction which is
the subject matter of discussion were ,both involved in the following cases: Davies v.
Fisher, 5 Beav. 201, 49 Eng. Rep. 554 (1842); Fox v. Fox, L. R. 19 Eq. 286 (1875);
Armstrong v. Barber, 239 m. 389, 88 N.E. 246 (1909); Kountz's Estate (No. I), 213 Pa.
390, 62 A. 1103 (1906).
800 Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
801 [1912] I Oh. 489.
302 See the remarks of Cozens-Hardy, M. R. (id. at 494), Buckley, L. J. (id. at 497)
and Fletcher Moulton, L. J. (id. at 495). The doctrine is discussed in CAREY AND SCHUYLER,
§332; HAWKINS, 275-276; 2 JARMAN, 1407-1408.
303 5 Hare 573, 67 Eng. Rep. 1038 (1844).
304 Id. at 578.
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The doctrine of severance has been accepted at least to some
extent in the United States, 305 even in connection with class
gifts,300 although the nature of the formula is such that its application to non-class gifts is more readily discernible. Like the other
rules concerning vesting, the reasoning on which this one is
founded is to some degree question-begging, since the decision
that no one except the beneficiary or beneficiaries of a gift have
any interest in the subject matter of the gift amounts in itself to
a decision that the gift is vested in the most absolute sense, i.e.,
in the sense of unqualified ownership. On the other hand, where
there is a mandate to set aside specific property and where no interest in the property or the income from it is conferred upon
anyone other than the beneficiary, it is not altogether unreasonable to infer an intention to bestow upon the beneficiary an immediate interest in the property. Thus regarded, the doctrine of
severance has at least a little more substance than some of the
other rules of construction as to vesting.
8. The Rule of Edwards v. Hammond-Effect Upon Vesting
of a Gift Over. In Edwards v. Hammond 307 A had surrendered
lands to his own use for life and thereafter to the use of his eldest
son and his heirs if the latter should live to attain the age of 21
years; provided and upon condition that if the eldest son die before 21 the lands should remain to the surrenderer and his heirs.
After A's ·death his eldest son, being 17, was held entitled to succeed in ejectment against A's youngest son who had entered upon
the lands. The eldest son's interest was thought to be vested to be
divested. The case is now thought to support the rule that a gift
to one when or if he reaches a given age followed by a gift over
upon his death under that age creates a vested interest in the
named taker. The inference of vesting must necessarily be derived
from the presence of the gift over because in its absence the first
taker's interest would clearly be contingent.308
The English cases have not confined the rule of Edwards v.
Hammond to gifts in remainder but have applied it as well to
an immediate gift to A when he reaches a given age, followed by
a gift over if he dies under that age. 309 They have applied it also

305 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §332 at 459-460; SIMES AND SMITH, §658
306 O'Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458 at 467, 113 N.E. 127 (1916).
307 3 Lev. 132, 83 Eng. Rep. 614 (1683).
308 2 JARMAN, 1364.
309 Doe d. Hunt v. Moore, 14 East 601, 104 Eng. Rep. 732 (1811).

at 127-128.
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where the gift is in trust, 310 and it appears to make no difference
whether the gift over is to take effect on the death of the first
taker simpliciter, as in Edwards v. Hammond itself, or whether
the word "death" is coupled with a contingency, as where there
is a gift over upon the death of the first taker without leaving
issue surviving him. 311 And although the rule originally arose
in connection with a disposition of realty, it applies in England
with equal force to dispositions of personalty.312 Moreover, as in
the case of some of the other rules as to vesting, the fact that the
inquiry in Edwards v. Hammond was directed at whether or not
the interest there in question was vested in the feudal sense
(though the issue was the transmissibility and not the destructibility of the future interest) has been no deterrent to an extension of the rule to cases where the question for determination
was one of remoteness of vesting under the rule against perpetuities. So, a gift in trust to the children of a living person upon
their attaining an age in excess of 21, followed by a gift over
in case no child should attain the age specified, has been held to
confer vested and hence valid interests upon the children designated to take, and the gift over has been regarded as a strong, if
not conclusive, justification for the results reached. 313
The rationalization advanced in favor of the rule of Edwards
v. Hammond has been that "the subsequent gift over ... sufficiently shows the meaning ... to have been that the first devisee
should take whatever interest the party claiming under the devise over is not entitled to ... ," 314 and that "the devise over is
considered as explanatory of the sense in which the testator intended the devisee's interest in the property to depend upon his
attaining the specified age, namely, that at that age it should
become absolute and indefeasible; the interest in question, therefore, is construed to vest instanter."315 If these explanations mean,
as they seem to, that the gift over is a clause of divestiture and
that from this it follows that the prior interest is vested, one
must answer that the conclusion that the gift over is a clause of

,,:i>

310 Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & Fin. 583, 8 Eng. Rep. 539 (1842).
311Ibid.
312 In re Heath, [1936] Ch. 259.
313 See especially Fox v. Fox, L. R. 19 Eq.. 286 at 291: " ••• [I']he gift over, if not
conclusive on the question, certainly aids the construction adopted by me." Per Jessel,
M. R. To the same effect, see Bland v. Williams, 3 My. & K. 411, 40 Eng. Rep. 156 (1834);
Davies v. Fisher, 5 Beav. 201, 49 Eng. Rep. 554 (1842); In re Turney, [1899] 2 Ch. 739.
314 Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & Fin. 583 at 592, 8 Eng. Rep. 539 (1842).
315 2 JARMAN, 1364.
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divestiture (unless it is expressly so designated) can be reached
only on the supposition that the first taker's interest is vested,
for otherwise there would be nothing to divest. Hence, to label
the gift over as a clause of divestiture is to decide just what is
to be decided-whether or not the first taker's interest is vestedand the circle of absurdity is completed. That this criticism of
the rationale of the rule of Edwards v. Hammond is in considerable measure justified is attested by the expressions of more than
one able English judge doubting the logic of the rule. 316 Moreover, although the rule has met with the approval of some American courts, 317 there are others which have taken the position that
a gift over, far from giving rise to an inference of vesting, gives
rise to an inference of contingency,318 and still others which have
said that the absence, not the presence, of a gift over is an indication that vesting is not to be protracted.319 It seems a fair conclusion that there is nothing more indisputably compelling about
the rule of Edwards v. Hammond than there is about any of the
other rules relating to vesting so far discussed. That this rule
may prevent intestacy (as where there is a gift to A at 25, and
if he dies without issue under that age, then over) is as much or
as little a justification for its application in transmissibility cases
as is so in connection with all of the other rules tending toward
early vesting in that sense. It does not follow that the rule of
Edwards v. Hammond has any relationship to the objectives of
the rule against perpetuities.
9. The Rule That Words of Survivorship Will Ordinarily Refer to the Time When a Gift Becomes Distributable. One might
suppose that the words "survivor" or "surviving" or words of
similar import are singularly unambiguous, and in one sense
they are. Where, however, a gift of a future interest is made
to a group of persons "surviving," or to a class "or the survivors
or survivor" of them or to those who are "living," the words of
816 Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. 8e Fin. 583 at 595-596, 8 Eng. Rep. 539 (1842), per Lord
Brougham; In re Heath, [1936] Ch. 259 at 261: "Apart altogether .from authority I think
that anyone looking at .the terms of the gift itself would not :hesitate long before they
said it was a contingent gift.•••" Per Fanvell, J.
S17 Bush v. Hamill, 273 Ill. 132, 112 N.E. 375 (1916); Hoblit v. Howser, 338 Ill. 328,
170 N.E. 257 (1930); Hughes v. Hughes, 51 Ky. 115 (1851); Hersey v. Purington, 96 Me.
166, 51 A. 865 (1902); Roome v. Phillips, 24 N.Y. 463 (1862); Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303
at 380 (1871); Raney v. Heath, 2 Pat. 8e H. (Va.) 206 (1856); Sellers' '.Executor v. Reed, 88
Va. 377, 13 S.E. 754 (1891); 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.32.
318Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287 (1910); 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§21.32; SIMES AND SMITH, §590 at 40, n. 98.
819 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.22; SIMES AND SMITH, §590 at 41, n. 1.
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survivorship, in order to be given meaning, must be made referable to some point of time. This factor, by imparting to the words
an equivocal meaning, creates a problem which can be solved
only through the construction process.
Suppose, for example, a gift to A for life, remainder to his
"living children," or to his "surviving children," or to his "children or the survivors or survivor of them" or to "A and B or the
survivor of them." In the first three instances, the words survivorship may refer to the death of the testator or to the death of
the tenant for life; in the fourth, the word "survivor" may in
addition refer to such of A and B as survives the other. Courts
have frequently been called upon to resolve the meaning of
words of survivorship with varying results, some taking the position that words of survivorship relate to the death of the testator,320 others that they refer to the time when the future interest
becomes possessory. 321
Those courts which hold that words of survivorship are to be
referred to the testator's death rationalize their decisions on one
or more of several grounds. This construction, it is said, (I) tends
to minimize the possibility of intestacy, which might result from
the death of all the potential takers before the prior estate or
estates end; (2) accords with the presumption against disinheritance where the gift of the future interest is to lineals; (3) favors
equality of distribution; and (4) comports with the rule of early
vesting.322 All this may be true, but the fact remains that the
English courts, repudiating an earlier view to the contrary,323
and a majority of American courts324 have more generally thought
that the normal and natural meaning of words of survivorship
may better be given effect by treating such words as relating to
the period at which the gift is limited to take effect in possession.
The result in these jurisdictions of course is that gifts such as
those supposed are contingent on survivorship and it seems to
make no difference whether the gift is of realty or personalty325
or whether it is to individuals or to a class.326

n.

320 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.15 at 150-151; SIMES AND SMITH, §577 at 14-15,
24.
3215 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.15 at 150; SIMES AND SMITH, §577 at 16-17, n. 25.
322 114 A.L.R. 4 at 13-17 (1938).
323 HAWKINS, 310-322.
324 SIMES AND SMITH, §577 at 15-16; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§304, 335.
325 HAWKINS, 312. .
326 SIMES AND SMITH! §577 at 18-19.
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The particular phraseology of gifts involving words of survivorship has given rise to numerous refinements327 which need not
detain us here. For present purposes, it is enough to observe that
we are confronted with another constructional problem which,
if not inherent in the concept of vesting, at least appears to be an
inseparable component of the unfortunately characteristic failure
of draftsmen to recognize and eliminate uncertainties. It is no
doubt true that words of survivorship are apt to occasion more
disputes as to transmissibility than perpetuity questions, but such
words are indeed capable of creating the latter.328 Thus, once
again, the innate obscurity of the concept of vesting may breed
perpetuity litigation.
IO. Rules Favoring Vested-To-Be-Divested Over Contingent
Interests. The early tendency of courts to construe remainders
as vested in the feudal sense was extended to a favoritism for interests which are vested to be divested rather than contingent.
Thus courts generally, if not universally, hold a gift in default
of appointment, if not contingent upon some event other than
the exercise of a power, is vested to be divested,329 as, for instance,
if property is given to A for life, remainder to such persons as A
shall by will appoint, remainder in default of appointment to B in
fee. The same is often true where the life tenant or others may have
a power to encroach upon capital.330 Likewise, where a gift of a
future interest is subject to a condition, such as the payment of
money or the performance of some act by the beneficiary, the
tendency is to construe the condition as subsequent rather than
precedent, thus rendering the gift defeasibly vested instead of
contingent. 831 So, too, where a gift is to a class as in the case of
a gift to A for life, remainder to his children, A's children will
327 HAWKINS, 312-322. If the gift is to A for life, remainder to B and C, but if either
dies during A's lifetime, then to the survivor, the survivorship has •been deemed to be
survivorship of the taker who dies first. Id. at 313. But if in a similar gift the share of
the one dying is to be transferred to the survivor, the survivorship has been referred to
the time of distribution. Id. at 313-314. Where there is a gift to A for life, remainder to
his ohildren at 21, followed by words of survivorship, the words may refer to the attainment of 21. Id. at 314. Sometimes the words may be so used as to permit the gift to be
construed as vested to be divested, as if the gift is to a class or those living at the time
of distribution. Id. at 316-317. The words have also caused difficulties with respect to
the disposition of accruing shares. Id. at 319-322.
328 Whitby v. Von Luedecke, [1906] 1 Ch. 783.
829 Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sr. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 (1748); Doe d. Willis v.
Martin, 4 Term. Rep. 39, 100 Eng. Rep. 882 (1790); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§21.3la; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §299; SIMES AND SMITH, §150.
830 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §299; SIMES AND SMITH, §150.
8315 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.3ld; SIMES AND SMITH, §151.
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ordinarily be said to take interests which are irrevocably vested
in quality, subject to being partially divested in quantity by the
birth of further children.332
Gifts such as those to which reference is made in the preceding
paragraph have caused no great confusion. But a gift of a future
interest to a class of persons may be complicated by alternative
limitations, and these have generated, with respect to the vested
or contingent character of the first limitation,333 a very considerable body of litigation. Illustrative of this sort of disposition
would be a gift to A for life, remainder to his children or their
descendants; or a gift to A for life, remainder to his children or
the issue of any who die leaving·issue; or a gift to A for life, remainder to his children and if A dies without children then to B
in fee. In cases of this sort there has frequently arisen a question
as to whether the alternative gift in remainder (if it is decided
that it is referable to the ending of the antecedent estate and not to
the death of the testator) imparts a contingent quality to the
primary gift in remainder. In other words, must the remaindermen survive the tenant for life in order to take, or are the interests of the remaindermen vested to be divested only upon the
occurrence of the event which permits the alternative limitation
actually to take effect? Results reached in such cases will of
course vary according to the particular instrument construed,
but they also vary in terms of the degree of preference of particular courts for vested interests.334
Although gifts of the type discussed in this subdivision are
more likely to involve legal remainders following legal life estates
and hence to involve no perpetuity question, alternative limitations akin to those of which examples are given in the preceding paragraph can, and not uncommonly do, occur in connection with trust gifts.335 Where these occur, and where the
332 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §300; SIMES AND SMITH, §146.
333 The alternative limitation, unless the event upon

which it is to take effect is
construed as one which must occur during the testator's lifetime, is by its nature contingent on the primary taker's predeceasing the ending of the anterior estate. It may
or may not be regarded as contingent on survivorship of the antecedent estate. 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§21.25, 22.54; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§229-233; SIMES AND
SMITH, §§583 (at 28), 659. This is normally a "transmissibility" and not a perpetuity
question. Part of the problew. results from a tendency to confuse the issue of transmissibility whh the issue of when ~he class closes. Id., §§654, 655.
334 Tihese and other similar limitations are discussed in 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§§21.3lc; 22.54; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§302, 305, 307; SIMES AND SMITH, §§148, 149,
581-583, 659.
335 Examples are cited in SIMES AND SMITH, §§581-583.

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIBS

915

primary gift is not certain to become possessory within the period
of the rule, then of course the alternative gift is virtually certain
to be invalid and the primary gift will also be void unless it is
held to be vested. It may be observed that in these cases, whether
the rule against perpetuities is involved or not, the primary gift
might logically be vested by the rule of construction (in those
jurisdictions where it exists) that a gift over creates an inference
of vesting in respect of the gift, which it would defeat. As we
have seen, however, logic does not always prevail where the
vested character of future interests is in issue and the effect and
even the existence of the gift over as such is often ignored. This
could be the result of the infinite variations and intricacies which
may characterize limitations followed by alternative limitations336
and which may well obfuscate the possibility of invoking a rule
of construction the application of which to less entangled dispositions may be more readily perceived. But considering the
conclusion reached earlier, that a gift over cannot reasonably
be said to give rise to an inference of vesting, one might say that
it is of no great importance to speculate as to why the application
of this rule of construction is not more often invited by alternative limitations of the type here considered. However, there
may be some logic in theorizing as to why this illogical rule of
construction should not be applied in connection with such limitations if by doing so one succeeds in offering an additional illustration of why application of the rule against perpetuities to
remoteness of vesting compounds the rule's complexities.
II. Other Rules of Construction Relating to Vesting. The
rules concerning vesting heretofore discussed may be regarded
as rules of major importance. There are of course other rules
which are perhaps no less significant but which do not require
such extended comment. There are in addition constructional
problems created by various gifts which do not lend themselves
to or have not yet brought about settled rules of construction.
No attempt will be made to consider the latter but an effort will
be made to summarize the rules not already considered which
appear to be of sufficient general import to require comment.
The fact that a gift is residuary is said to tend toward causing
it to vest. As stated by Hawkins, ". . . courts especially lean in

836 See, as illustrating complex alternatives, Black v. Todd, 121 S.C. 243, 113 S.E.
793 (1922).
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favor of vesting in the bequest of a residue." 337 This rule is obviously a counterpart of the presumption against intestacy, for if
a residuary gift is contingent on survivorship and if the taker
predeceases the time specified for distribution, intestacy will be
the consequence. The rule seems, like many of the rules as to
vesting, frequently to be employed conjunctively with others.338
Although in its origin it is related to the term "vested" in the
sense of "transmissible" or "non-contingent on survivorship,"
courts have not been discriminate in its application and have seen
fit to apply it where the question for decision is a perpetuity
one.339
The English cases, especially the earlier ones, favor the view
that a legacy charged on land is contingent on survivorship,840
the theory being that the heir is a favorite of the court.341 The
failure of American courts generally to adopt this position342 seems
very possibly attributable to the tendency in this country to fuse
the rules of construction applicable to dispositions of realty and
personalty.848
Gifts to unascertained persons, as to the "heirs" or "heirs of
the body" of a living person, are of course quite generally
held to be contingent.844 In such cases, the question to be dealt
with is not whether the future interest is contingent, but whether,
upon a proper construction of the instrument of gift, those designated as takers are truly unascertainable until a future time.8il>
Thus, if in the cases supposed the words "heirs" or "heirs of the
body" may properly be interpreted to mean "children," those
who will take will upon birth answer the description of takers
and their interests will not necessarily remain contingent until
the death of their ancestor.346

337 HAWKINS, 276. See also CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §336; 2 JARMAN, 1409. The leading
case, from a historical standpoint, appears to be Booth v. Booth, 4 Ves. Jr. 399, 31 Eng.
Rep. 203 (1799).
338 2 JARMAN, 1409-1419.
839 Id. at 1413-1414, 1417-1418.
840 HAWKINS, 279-281; 2 JARMAN, 1382-1386.
841 Prowse v. Abingdon, 1 Atk. 482 at 486, 26 Eng. Rep. 306 (1738), per Lord
Hardwicke. But the learned chancellor also observed that the true basis for the rule
was that, so far as lands were concerned, the common law should control, whereas as to
personalty equity would apply civil law rules.
342 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.18 at 154; SIMES AND SMITH, §584.
843 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §337.
844 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.3le; SIMES AND SMITH, §152.
845 SIMES AND SMITH, §i53.
846 Id. at 172.
0
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Spendthrift prov1s1ons in a trust, reqmrmg payment of income or principal to the beneficiaries "in person" or "on their
personal receipt," have been held to cause a suspension of vesting
on the theory that there can be ·compliance with the mandate of
the spendthrift clause only if the beneficiary survives the time
of payment.347 It seems doubtful that a spendthrift clause, usually
inserted in an instrument as a device to protect the beneficiary
during his lifetime, has any bearing upon what the maker of
a gift intended or would have intended with respect to the vested
or contingent character of any future interests which he creates.848
Again, the question is usually whether a transmissible interest
exists. One case, however, places some stress upon the existence
of a spendthrift clause in reaching the conclusion that a future interest was contingent and hence offensive to the rule against perpetuities.349

C. Vesting and the Purposes of the Rule
1. Sense and Nonsense in the Concept of Vesting. We have
seen that the historical relationship between seisin and vesting
and the development of contingent remainders made explicable,
if not necessary, the early distinction between vested and contingent remainders. In a modem system of law, however, except
in those jurisdictions where contingent remainders are still
destructible, it is difficult to justify the feudal differentiations
between vested and contingent future interests unless in terms
of their relationship to the rule against perpetuities. So far as
alienability is concerned, it may be observed that contingent
• remainders have been made alienable in many jurisdictions without harmful results. 350 And the practicalities attendant upon the
enforcement of the rights of creditors or those of a trustee in
bankruptcy ought certainly not to depend upon feudal notions
of vesting.351 It may be that the holder of a contingent future
interest should be protected against his own profligacy or the

34.7 CAREY

AND SCHUYLER, §338; id., Supp. 1954, §338.
CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §338 at 471; id., Supp. 1954, §338 at 199; COSTIGAN, CAsES
ON TRUSTS 468 (1925); GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS, 2d ed., 89 (194'1); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS,
2d ed., §158.1 (1956).
84.9~aston v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397 at 417-420, 154 N.E. 216 (1926). But see Saltonstall
v. Treasurer&: Receiver General, 256 Mass. 519, 153 N:E. 4 (1926), affd. 276 U.S. 260 (1928).
850 SIMES AND SMITH, §1854.
351 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting,"
46 Iu... L. R.Ev. 407 at 430-432 (1951).
348
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depredations of unscrupulous creditors upon a sale of the interest.352 But this has nothing to do with feudal vesting; the
same ethical concepts apply as well to defeasibly vested interests.s5s
Even in acceleration cases, the contingent or feudally vested
nature of future interests should not be significant. For acceleration inevitably results in an attempt to approximate the intention to be imputed to the maker of a gift upon the happening of
an unanticipated event; and this cannot be accomplished by
reference to an outmoded distinction which never was and probably never could have been understood by the maker of the original
gift. When a prior estate is renounced, the destiny of ulterior
limitations can be sensibly decided only by resort to the delicate
process of forming a judgment as to what the donor would have
wanted under the circumstances.354 To the end that litigation
may be minimized, rules of construction may be desirable in typical cases, but that does not vindicate the application of outmoded
rules.
The fact that reversions are feudally vested interests which
are incident to literally thousands of modern commercial transactions might be urged as an objection to the complete abandonment of the feudal concept of vesting. Here again, however, there
is little need to operate within the framework of the ancient property law. It makes little difference,355 under the present social order, whether we say that the reversioner is "seised" or that he
"owns" an interest in the fee. But for historical reasons, the holder
of an interest contingent in the modern sense, i.e., subject to some
condition precedent, can equally be regarded as owning some
interest in the fee. The important thing is that a reversion is
ordinarily subject to no condition precedent and the reversioner's
right to possession is subject only to the ending of the term or
other estate carved out of the fee. The rights of the reversioner can
be preserved even if confounding nomenclature is not. Thus
it seems that the terms "vested" and "contingent" in their feudal

352 Cf. In re Reifsteck, (E. D. Ill. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 157; Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis.
11, 258 N.W. 391 (1935).
353 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting,''
46 ILL. L. REv. 407 at 431 (1951).
354 Schuyler, "Future Interests in Illinois: Current Maturities and Some Futures,''
50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 457 at 485-486, 489-490 (1955).
355 It may of course still make a difference with respect to dower rights. SIMES AND
SMITH, §1887.
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sense could be well-nigh forgotten if they cannot be reasonably
related to the rule against perpetuities. Can the same be said of
their more modem connotations?
Today an interest is vested, whether or not in the feudal
sense, if it is subject to no condition precedent; it is contingent
if some condition precedent must be fulfilled before it may take
effect. But an interest may be contingent, in the sense of being
subject to a condition precedent, and still be transmissible.
Moreover, even though feudally vested, or vested in the sense
of being subject to no condition precedent, an interest may be
defeasibly vested because it is subject to a condition subsequent.
If so, it may or may not be transmissible depending upon the nature of the condition subsequent. And, as already shown, as though
the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between conditions precedent and subsequent were not enough of a problem, courts
constantly use the terms vested and contingent as though they
were interchangeably employable to designate each of the several meanings which the words are capable of connoting. Be it
noted, however, that even if courts and lawyers could be induced
to abandon the words "vested" and "contingent" (or define in
each case the sense in which they are being used), it will, as long
as future interests are permitted to exist and as long as instruments of gifts are not perfectly framed, be necessary for courts
to decide whether defectively created future interests are (1) subject to any condition at all; (2) if so, whether the condition is precedent or subsequent; and (3) if either precedent or subsequent,
whether or not the future interest is transmissible (non-contingent
on survivorship). And whereas the destructibility of future interests, their alienability, their availability to creditors or to a trustee
in bankruptcy and their susceptibility to acceleration in case an
anterior estate is renounced do not or should not depend upon
feudal vesting, each one of these very practical attributes (or the
lack of it) is intimately related to their vested or contingent
character in the senses just defined. Hence, in these senses, it
cannot be said that the distinctions between vested and contingent
interests are important, if at all, only for purposes of the
rule against perpetuities. The question is whether these distinctions, admittedly vital for other purposes, should constitute the
linchpin of the rule itself. The answer rests primarily on two subsidiary and closely interrelated inquiries: (I) should the entangled
concept of vesting determine the validity of future interests? (2)
does vesting satisfy the objectives of the rule?
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2. Vesting as Determinative of Validity. The rule against
perpetuities is a rule of property; its application or non-application .is theoretically determined without regard for intention.
But the latter statement is followed more in the breach than in
the observance356 and there is of course one exception to it which
is openly recognized. For an interest which is vested is not subject
to the rule, and whether an interest is vested or not is said to be
a matter of intention. Thus, at least in this respect, validity or
invalidity is, in principle, a matter of intention. This obviously
does not mean that a testator can create a remote future interest
which is clearly contingent and make it valid by saying that he
intends the interest to be vested. It does mean, however, that an
element of flexibility is injected into an otherwise almost wholly
rigid rule of property the devastating consequences of which are
well known to all and have already been commented upon. Flexibility in law is ,;:ertainly desirable, and if the concept of vesting
made the rule against perpetuities sensibly pliable a strong argument could be made for retaining it. Flexibility, however, when
its limits are undefinable, is apt to lead to a degree of uncertainty
approaching chaos, and a truly basic element of a stable social
order is violated-the right of men living in such a society intelligently to evaluate the consequences of their acts and the need
for the leg-al profession to be able to predict with considerable
accuracy the results of contemplated litigation. If the volume of
literature on the subject is any measure, one might conclude
that the distinction between "vested" and "contingent" interests
is so obscure, tenuous and uncertain that it should be altogether
eliminated from the law of perpetuities if not from the law of
future interests.357 That the latter (as indicated in the preceding
subdivision) cannot be done does not justify the maintenance
of the distinction in connection with the rule against perpetuities, if it is indeed true that it tends toward excessive disorder.
356 For discussions of construction and the rule, see 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§§24.43-24.46; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §508; GRAY, §§629-670; .MORRIS AND LEACH, 236-247;
SIMES AND SMITH, §§1288-1292.
357 For example, Professors Simes and Smith devote more pages to vesting [SIMES
AND SMITH, §§131-209 (137 pages), §§571-594 (44 pages) and §§652-659 (36 pages), a total
of 217 pages] than they do to the rule against perpetuities itself [id., §§1201-1395 (166
pages)]. Professor Carey and the writer devote almost as many pages to vesting [CAREY
AND SCHUYLER, §§291-339 (77 pages)] as to the rule [id., §§471-508 (91 pages)]. The same
is not true of AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY where 162 ,pages (6 id., §§24.1-24.68) are
occupied with a discussion of the rule and only 50 (5 id., §§21.5-21.32, 22.54) deal with
problems of vesting.
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For the inability to eliminate all legal quandaries is not a reason
for nurturing those that can be eradicated.
What Professor Leach has dexterously characterized as the
"polysemantic character"358 of the words "vested" and "contingent" has been developed in the preceding pages of this article.
Elsewhere, Professor Leach and Dr. Morris make an admirable
effort to define vesting for purposes of the rule. They say that an
interest is vested within the meaning of the rule when, "(a) the
taker is ascertained, and (b) any condition precedent attached to
the interest is satisfied, and (c) where the interest is included in
a gift to a class, the exact amount or fraction to be taken is determined...." 359 This definition is simple enough and it would indeed be helpful if courts would adopt it whenever confronted
with a question of vesting under the rule. The difficulty is, as
these same authors admit, that, "The distinctions in this field
are so delicate, and depend so often upon a minute consideration
of the whole language of an instrument. . . .''360 Which is really
to say that even if courts did adopt the relatively simple definition
of vesting-for-purposes-of-the-rule which these authors suggest, the
profession and the judiciary would still be faced with divining
intentions that never actually existed as to whether takers are or
are not ascertained, whether a condition is or is not attached to a
gift and whether a condition is precedent or subsequent. Thus,
though the simplification of the definition of vesting would be a
step in the right direction, it could not be expected to eliminate
the major problem injected by the concept of vesting, i.e., the
ascertainment of a usually nonexistent intention.
It is of course frequently necessary for courts in construing
wills to impute to testators intentions concerning matters with
respect to which no real intention existed. Where, for example,
property is given over upon "death" or "death without issue,"
where there is a gift to a class containing no specification as to
the time of closing, where a gift may be divided either per stirpes
or per capita-in all these and numerous other situations-more
than one result is possible and courts must decide which one to
adopt. It is not in itself startling, then, that the concept of vesting
forces courts into a quest for motives which never actually subsisted. However, in other instances where this is necessary, rules of
858 LEACH, CASES ON FurURE INTERESTS,
859 MORRIS AND I.EACH, 37.
860

Id. at 37-38.

2d ed., 255 (1940).

922

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 56

construction which have been developed are frequently (though by
no means always) based upon logical inference. That this is not
so of the rules as to vesting has been demonstrated by the relatively detailed review of those rules contained in this article. Even
this might conceivably be tolerable if these rules were applied
with sufficient uniformity to minimize confusion. But that is not
in the nature of the concept of vesting as it is being developed,
nor is it reasonable to expect courts to be firm and consistent
in the application of rules in which they have and can have but
little faith. 861 At the same time, however the term vested may be
defined, it must be expected that, in a system of law which consecrates precedent, lawyers and courts will not readily abandon the
subtle refinements as to vesting which have been developed in
the course of some five centuries -of search for one of the most
elusive fugitives known to Anglo-American law-intention as
to vesting. The conclusion must be that vesting is not an appropriate test of whether a future interest will stand or fall under
a rule which may destroy it unless the objections to it are outweighed by the degree to which it serves the objectives of the
rule.
3. Does Vesting Seroe the Objectives of the Rule? Part of
the answer to the question' which is the heading of this subdivision is to be found in the discussion which has preceded. For it
seems clear that one objective of a rule having consequences
as severe as those attendant upon a violation of the rule against
perpetuities should be to afford a reasonably workable formula
for balancing testamentary purposes against the purposes which
the rule seeks to accomplish. To the extent that the concept of
vesting introduces an extraordinary degree of indefiniteness into
the rule it tends to rob the formula of its workability. In this
sense the notion of vesting impinges upon what ought to be a
legitimate aim of the rule. This is not to suggest that the rule
should be made to be rigid and unbending. Indeed, if the flexibility afforded by the non-application of the rule to vested interests is removed, a substitute will have to be found. 862

361 See, for example, the remarks of Surrogate Wingate in In re Montgomery's
Estate, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 406 at 409-416 (1938), and of Weaver, J., in Dowd v. Scally, (Iowa
1919) 174 N.W. 938 at 939-940.
362 Cf. Hou.1ES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920): "The language of judicial
decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and' form flatter that
longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."
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In a more particular sense our inquiry should be directed
at the relationship of vesting to the present-day purposes of the
rule. Does the destruction of remote contingent interests tend
to make property more fluid, to free capital from testamentary
restrictions and to stay the influence of the dead hand? To this
question the answer must be in the affirmative. It is not so easy
to answer affirmatively the companion question: does the exemption of vested interests from the rule further these objectives?
Or, perhaps more fairly put, are the characteristics of vested
interests such that, however remotely they may become possessory,
they do not constitute obstacles to achieving what the rule is
intended to accomplish?
It has already been seen that Gray himself doubted the
propriety of excluding even feudally vested remainders from
the sphere of the rule's operation.363 And although Gray seems to
have been unduly concerned with the rule as punitive in nature,
it certainly is demonstrable that even feudally vested interests
may unduly fetter alienability and extend the reach of the dead
hand. Indeed, in this respect many contingent interests are little
more troublesome than those which are vested. For example, from
these points of view, there is little practical difference between
a gift over to B in fee, following a gift to A for life, remainder
to his unborn son for life, and a contingent gift over to B following the same life estates. In each instance, absent a power of sale
and a rule of destructibility, the title remains as unmarketable
and the hand of the deceased maker of the gift is as controlling
until A has a son who is old enough to join in a conveyance. And
when this has occurred, even though B's interest is contingent,
both life tenants, the reversioner and B can deliver a marketable
title and free the property from the testamentary restriction. The
problem of apportioning the proceeds is only a little more difficult
than it is if B's interest is vested; the only added factor is the interest of the reversioner. The same cannot of course be said where
the holder of the future interest is incapable of ascertainment, but
that is sometimes true of vested interests, as in the case of a simple
gift to A for life, remainder to his children.364 And obviously
there may be other contingent interests which frustrate the purposes of the rule to a greater degree than feudally vested ones.
363 GRAY, §§970-974.
86¼ See, for example,

Deem v. Miller, 303
Smith, 222 Ky. 566, 1 S.W. (2d) 968 (1928).

m.

240, 135 N.E. 396 (1922); Azarch v.
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The point, however, is that the feudally vested character of outstanding future interests is no assurance that the rule's aims will
be met.
Certainly, if there are degrees of "vesting," an interest which
is feudally vested is vested to the greatest possible extent. Thus,
if feudal vesting does not serve the rule's objectives, it would
seem to follow, a fortiori, that vesting in any other sense would
also fail to do so. In this connection, it should be remembered that
an interest which is not feudally vested will nevertheless ordinarily be regarded as vested for purposes of the rule if its taker
is ascertaine_d and if it is subject to no condition precedent. Into
this category fall a large group of equitable interests the vested
or contingent character of which will depend upon the rules as
to vesting heretofore discussed, as for example gifts in trust,
following equitable life estates, to the child or children of a living
person distributable when the beneficiary or beneficiaries attain
an age in excess of 21 or upon the happening of some other event
which may not occur until after the period of the rule expires.
Where gifts of this sort are vested and hence valid, which they are
unless the rule applies to the duration of trusts as some have suggested it should,365 they certainly offend the spirit of the rule insofar as it looks with disfavor upon protracted dead hand control.
For if the rule is really concerned only with the beginning of
interests and not with their duration, 366 there would be nothing
to prevent a whimsical testator from creating a spendthrift trust
for the benefit of his children during their lives and thereafter
creating vested equitable future interests in his grandchildren
to be paid to them upon attaining an age of 60, 70 or even 80
years of age. Clearly this cannot be done if the rule, or some
kindred rule, applies to the duration of trusts. Observe, however, that if a trust cannot last beyond the period of the rule,
there should be nothing startling at all, at least with respect to
equitable interests, about the suggestion that remoteness of vesting should be forgotten and remoteness of possession substituted
in its place. At all events, it is not easy to argue, in connection
with the application of the rule to equitable interests of the sort
here considered, that the concept of vesting serves the rule's objectives. Indeed, in a case such as that supposed in this paragraph,
8611 GRAY, §§119-121.8; KAI.Es, FUTURE INTERESTS,
SIMES AND SMITH, §1393 at 245-246.
866 GRAY, §§232-236.

(1920);

2d ed., §§658-661, 677-681, 732-738
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the non-application of the rule against perpetuities, if there is
to be any rule at all, would be a travesty.

D. Summary
The concept of vesting, in relation to the rule and elsewhere,
has occasioned a vast amount of litigation. This has resulted in
part from the original relationship between seisin (with all of
its ancient obscurities) and vesting in its feudal sense, and in part
from the failure of lawyers and courts to distinguish with any
degree of clarity between the several meanings of "vested" and
"contingent" which these terms have acquired through a haphazard process of transformation. It is also due in part to the
apparently incurable tendency of draftsmen to fail to anticipate
and provide unambiguously for the happening of reasonably
foreseeable contingencies. For these reasons, the great body of
decisions concerning vested and contingent interests have not
clarified the law in this area to any marked degree. Instead, there
has been developed a large group of rules of construction, designed to assist in determining intention with respect to vesting,
most of which bear no logical relationship to their avowed purpose. Moreover, these rules are applied without discrimination
where the "vested" or "contingent" character of a future interest
is at issue regardless of the meaning in which those terms are
used and with no thought of the purpose for which a determination of "vesting" or "contingency" is being made. The result is
disorder perilously close to chaos.
While it must be admitted that, as a result of the concept of
vesting, the rule against perpetuities is less rigid than it would be
if it were unbendingly concerned with remoteness of possession,
the confusion described in the preceding paragraph overbalances
the flexibility afforded by the application of the rule to remoteness of vesting alone. A redefinition of vesting-for-purposes-ofthe-rule is unlikely to resolve this problem, because it is hardly
supposable that lawyers and courts will lose their affinity for all
of the refined distinctions which have been developed with respect to vesting. It is, moreover, no answer to say that we will
always have to concern ourselves with vesting in other senses,
as in the sense of transmissibility. That we must worry over
whether a future interest is or is not contingent on survivorship
does not mean that this and other troublesome aspects of vesting
should be retained as an integral part of the rule.
Apart from the foregoing, it is demonstrable that the exemp-
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tion of vested interests from the rule against perpetuities not only
does not satisfy the objectives of a modern rule of perpetuities
but indeed tends strongly to frustrate these purposes. A vested
interest may affect marketability and extend the control of the
dead hand to just as great a degree as most contingent interests.
Thus the conclusion that the concept of vesting should be eliminated from the rule seems justified. Possible effects of such a
step and how it could best be taken without converting the rule
into a rigid, mathematical rule of thumb will be considered in
the last part of this article.
IV. A

RULE .APPLIED TO REMOTENESS OF POSSESSION

If remoteness of possession were substituted for remoteness
of vesting as a test of validity under the rule against perpetuities,
Gray's rule would be amended to read, "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, in possession and enjoyment, not later than
21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that "vested in possession and enjoyment" should mean vested in possession and enjoyment free of any trust. 367 The very simplicity of such a modification makes it alluring. But does it create a rule which meets
the criticisms which have been directed at the present rule? Can
it be said that it creates a rule which meets the tests of simplicity
and practicability which ought to be characteristic of any rule
having such serious consequences? And finally, does it afford
needed :flexibility or would it quickly become a straightjacket
from whose confines conveyancers would look nostalgically upon
the good old days when the test of the validity of an interest was
when will it vest?
The first of these three questions must be answered in the negative. For the mere substitution of remoteness of possession for
remoteness of vesting as a test of validity leaves the rule open to
almost every ground for censure relevant to the existing rule.
The period of the rule would be unchanged so that whatever
objection there may be to lives in being and 21 years would remain. The requirement of absolute certainty of vesting, together
with the acceptance of all of the fantastic hypotheses incident to
the present rule, would be unchanged except that absolute cer867 Cf. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 81 (1955), where it is suggested
that an equitable life estate might be regarded as vested in possession and enjoyment.
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tainty of vesting in possession and enjoyment would be demanded.
Class gifts would still be completely valid or completely invalid.
The rule would still apply, at least to the extent that it is now
applicable, to options. It would still wholly invalidate interests
which transgressed it. Only its non-application to possibilities of
reverter, rights of entry and resulting trusts and, if it applies to
them at all, its application to administrative powers (because
trusts could not last beyond the specified period), would be eliminated. It is therefore plain that supplanting remoteness of vesting with remoteness of possession as the criterion of validity does
not dispense with the need for whatever reforms are indicated by
those infirmities in the present rule which are unrelated to
vesting.
Whether a rule which required all interests to vest in possession and enjoyment within lives in being and 21 years would be
practically workable and adequately flexible cannot be so summarily determined. Assuming that means can be devised to
obviate some or all of those failings of the present rule which are
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the effects and feasibility
of a rule directed at remoteness of possession can be judged only
by testing these in terms of suppositions specific applications of
such a rule. Only after this has been done will it be possible to
offer explicit suggestions as to what ought to be done with the
rule.
A. Specific Applications
I. To Reversions. A reversion is of course what is left when
the owner of an estate parts with less than he has. There may be
reversions in estates less than a fee simple, as where a life tenant
leases for a term or where the holder of a term subleases for less
than the full balance of the term. There may also be reversions,
or the equivalent thereof, in personal property. However, since
most of the same factors would be relevant in connection with
reversions in estates less than a fee and in personalty, it should
be sufficient to consider examples of reversions in fee.
It may be stated at the outset that a rule against perpetuities
which destroyed all reversions which were not bound to become
possessory within the limits of time would be neither feasible
nor workable. The effect of such a rule would be to invalidate
every reversion following a lease which might last longer than the
period of the rule. This would make it impossible for owners of
property to enter into long term leases the commercial utility of
which no responsible person would be prepared to question. It
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is therefore clear that if the rule were to apply to remoteness of
possession, reversions incident to commercial leases of realty and
personalty would have to be exempted from its operative sphere.
Reversions following life estates and non-commercial terms
require a different approach. No problem arises if the reversion
follows one life estate or a term which will not extend beyond the
period of the rule. The reversion following a gift to A for life
or a gift to A for 21 years will vest in possession or enjoyment
within the time allowed by the present rule. Suppose, however,
a gift to A for life, remainder to his unborn son during his life;
or a gift to A for I 00 years. The reversions incident to these gifts
would be wholly invalid if reversions were made void unless they
would necessarily vest, if at all, in possession and enjoyment within the period of the present rule. The consequence would seem
to be that title would be in limbo or that the property would
escheat. In either event the result is not practical, the penalty
too harsh.
·
It might be thought that the wait-and-see doctrine would
solve the problem. But the most cursory analysis demonstrates
that it will not, because if, after waiting-and-seeing, the reversion did not become vested in possession within the limits of
time, the same impractical and drastic result would follow. Another possibility would be a modified. wait-and-see approach,
that is, to allow the life estates in the case first supposed and the
term in the second case supposed to continue for the period of
the rule and then to require that the reversions automatically
become possessory. This might be feasible in connection with the
uncomplicated cases just considered, but problems incident to
the wait-and-see doctrine discussed in the earlier pages of this
article arise when the dispositions become more entangled. If,
for example, a gift is made to A for life, remainder to his children
during their lives, remainder to the X charity if it is in existence
when the life estates end, we have valid successive life estates, a
contingent remainder in fee and a reversion in fee outstanding.
Here, if the remainder is indestructible and if we wait-to-see
whether the remainder will become possessory within the perioa
of the rule or not, we are confronted until the period of the rule
expires (or at least until we can be sure whether or not the remainder will be valid or void) with the fettering effect of a remainder which may or may not turn out to be good. Even if,
assuming the X charity to be in existence at the expiration of the
period of the rule, we were willing to allow the remainder then

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

929

to become possessory, i.e., to accelerate it, we are still faced in
the interim with uncertainty as to the state of the title to the property. We are also faced with determining when and how often
applications may be made to a court to have the title declared.
As to non-trust gifts of realty and even of personalty, an unsalutary situation is created. And since "savings clauses" are uncommonly used in connection with non-trust gifts, it is not an
answer to suggest that the same effect would be achieved by the
existence of one in the instrument of gift.
A third alternative would be to exempt reversions in fee
from the rule which would leave them in exactly the position
that they now occupy. Since reversions in fee are not ordinarily
a serious impediment to marketability and since they are not
normally employed as a device to perpetuate control over
property, this should not too seriously impair the effectiveness
of the rule. It should be observed, however, that the exemption
of reversions from the rule might lead to some inconsistency if
feudally vested remainders were made subject to the rule as
they probably ought to be. If that were done it would not be
possible to make a valid gift in remainder to B in fee following
an estate to A for life, remainder to his unborn son for life. But
it might be possible to accomplish the same result by devising
property by one clause of a will to A for life, remainder to his
unborn child for life, and by devising the reversion to Bin fee by
another clause.868 If the possibility of such an obvious circumvention of the rule were regarded as dangerously undesirable,
it could be prevented by providing that an instrument of gift
giving rise to a reversion is incapable of passing any interest
in the reversion. Although such a restriction would be unnecessary if no perpetuity problem were involved, a complicating
factor would certainly be introduced by any attempt to make
the restraint inapplicable in such cases.
2. To Vested Remainders, As the term is used here, "vested
remainder" means a legal feudally vested remainder in real
estate, or its equivalent in personalty, as for example a remainder to B in fee or for life, following a life estate or an estate

sos As in Egerton v. Massey, 3 C.B. (n.s.) 338, 140 Eng. Rep. 771 (1857). And cf.
Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 -Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2d) 922 (1950),
where a possibility of reverter was allowed to pass, under the residuary clause of testatrix's
will, to the same persons who were unable to take under an executory devise which
violated the rule against perpetuities.
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pur autre vie or a term for years in A. Equitable remainders
in realty and personalty which, if they were legal interests, would
be feudally vested, as for example the interest in B where property is given to trustees in trust to pay the income to A for life
and upon his death to convey the property to B in fee or to pay
him the income during his life, will be discussed along with
other equitable interests in connection with the duration of
trusts.
If vesting in possession and enjoyment within the period
of the rule were required, all feudally vested remainders expectant upon the ending of a single life estate, an estate pur
autre vie, a term of 21 years or less, or several life estates successively limited to persons in being when the remainder was
created would still be valid. If, however, property was given
to A for life, or pur autre vie, remainder to his unborn son for
life, remainder to B in fee, the remainder would be void. Likewise, if property were given to A for 22 years, remainder to B
in fee, the remainder would be bad. Yet, in each instance, the
property would be no more or less marketable, nor would the
dead hand exercise more protracted control, than would be the
case if there had been no attempt to create any gift in remainder
or whether or not any rule against perpetuities existed at all. For
if no provision were made for a remainder, or if the remainder
were void, there would be a reversion outstanding which would
be as much of a restraint as the feudally vested remainders supposed. This is recognized by Gray in his discussion of the
possibility of a rule concerned with remoteness of possession
when he says, " ... [P]erhaps a remainder vesting [in possession]
at the remote termination of a preceding estate is no more objectionable than a reversion to the grantor. . . ." 369 Is this a
reason for exempting feudally vested remainders from a prohibition against remoteness of possession? It must be admitted
that a formally logical analysis could well result in an affirmative
answer because there is no substantial difference in modern law
between reversions and feudally vested remainders. The difficulty
is that once an attempt is made to exempt a remainder from
the rule on the ground that it is feudally vested we are immediately confronted with all of the feudal learning, and the refinements upon it, as to what constitutes a vested remainder-

369 GRAY,

§974.
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a predicament not likely to result from allowing reversions to
remain free of the rigors of the rule.
Reversions and feudally vested remainders would be accorded
like treatment if in both cases the antecedent estates were allowed
to continue for the period of the rule and the reversion or remainder were then allowed to become possessory. If this were
done, a remainder in fee to B following a gift to A for life,
remainder to his unborn son for life, would vest in possession
and enjoyment upon the death of A's son (or upon A's death
if he had no son) or upon the expiration of 21 years from A's
death, whichever event occurred first. A remainder following
a term would vest in possession and enjoyment at the end of
21 years. In other words, no estates anterior to the remainder
in fee would be permitted to continue longer than the period
of the rule. As in the case of reversions, this would afford a
workable solution in the simplest cases. Where, however, the
remainder was subject to divestment upon the happening of
an event which might or might not, on a wait-and-see basis,
occur at too remote a time, even a modified wait-and-see doctrine
is not satisfactory. For example, a gift to A for life, remainder
to his children during their lives, remainder to B in fee, but
if B dies without issue then to the X charity if it is in existence
when the life estates end, does not differ in any substantial
particular, so far as the problems that it would create, from
the gift, discussed in the preceding subdivision, to A for life,
remainder to his children during their lives, remainder to the
X charity if it is in existence when the life estates end. Thus,
if wait-and-see is to be rejected so far as reversions are concerned,
it ought also to be discarded in relation to vested remainders
even if they are to be invalid unless they are certain to become
possessory within the limits of time. That they should be distinguished from reversions in the latter respect is, as already
observed, indicated by the fact that failure to do so would result
in the retention of all of the old distinctions between remainders
which are vested, those which are contingent and those which
are vested to be divested.
3. To Legal Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests.
In this subdivision the term "contingent remainder" refers to
a legal remainder which is contingent in the feudal sense, that
is, any remainder following an estate or estates of freehold less
than a fee simple, which is not certain to take effect instantaneously upon the ending of the prior supporting estate or
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estates. A gift to A £or life, remainder to B if he is living at A's
death or to B when he reaches 21 would afford a typical example.
"Executory interest" refers to those legal future interests which
do not qualify as remainders in a technical sense either because,
if contingent, they are not supported by a freehold less than a fee
simple, or, if not subject to any condition precedent, they were
not recognized bef~re the Statute of Uses because of their springing or shifting nature. Examples would be a gift to A £or 25
years and if A dies without issue to Bin fee, or a devise to A "15
years after my death." Equitable contingent remainders and
executory interests will be left for consideration with the duration
of trusts.
Contingent remainders which are indestructible, as they are
in England and in a majority of American jurisdictions,370 are
indistinguishable from a perpetuity standpoint from executory
interests which are contingent in the sense of being subject to
a condition precedent. An indestructible contingent remainder to
such of A's children as reach 40, following a life estate in A, does
not differ, in terms of marketability of title and dead-hand control, from an executory interest limited over to such of the children of A as attain 40, whether before or after A's death.371 The
same may be said of the comparison between a protected contingent remainder to the heirs of A's unborn son following a gift to
A for life, and an executory gift over to the heirs of his unborn
son one year after A's death. It is obvious that all of these future
interests are void under the present rule against perpetuities and
that they would be void under a rule which insisted upon certainty of vesting in possession and enjoyment within the prescribed
period. Indeed, it is not possible that any contingent remainder
or contingent executory interest could be good under such a rule
if it offended the present rule. It is equally plain that future interests such as those described in this paragraph should be subject
to control from a perpetuity standpoint if there is to be any rule
at all. -Can this also be said of those executory interests which are
certain to take effect?
Although Gray said that an estate given to A in fee 50 years
after the testator's death would be too remote, 372 Professor Simes

§207.
v. Allen, 12 M. &: W. 279, 152 ·Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843), with In re
Lechemere and Lloyd, 18 Ch. Div. 524 (1881).
372 GRAY, §201, n. 3.
370 SIMES AND SMITH,
371 Compare Festing
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is of a contrary opinion,373 and it is difficult to see how a rule
directed at remoteness of vesting alone could reasonably be regarded as causing a testamentary or inter vivos executory gift to A
in fee, to take effect in possession upon the happening of an
event certain to occur, to be void. Thus, under the present rule
a gift to A in fee, by conveyance or devise, to take effect 25 or 50
years hence ought to be perfectly valid. Such a gift is only feudally
contingent but it is not contingent in any other sense; it is certain to take effect (if valid) and "vested" in every other sense.
But, if it were necessary to validity that the gift be certain to
take effect in possession and enjoyment within the period of the
rule, the gift in question would be bad unless the period of
time within which it was to become possessory were 21 years or
less. It has already been shown that from a strictly logical stand•
point there is no more objection, from the point of view of the
purposes of the rule against perpetuities, to a feudally vested
remainder to B in fee following a term of more than 21 years
than there is to a reversion in fee. The same may be said of an
irrevocably "vested" executory interest which is to take effect
after more than 21 years. But we have seen that the difficulties
inherent in determining whether remainders are feudally vested,
contingent or vested-to-be-divested, appears to justify different
perpetuity treatment for reversions and rema,inders. This is equally true of reversions and "vested" executory interests. For as soon
as the gift of an executory interest is complicated by any alternative limitation, as for instance if the gift is to A in fee 50 years
hence and in case of his death or death without issue then to B in
fee, it becomes necessary to decide whether A's interest is "vested"
or "vested-to-be-divested" if "vested" executory interests of this
sort are to be exempt from the rule. It seems, therefore, that
even "vested" executory interests should be subject to a rule
concerned with vesting in possession and enjoyment.
There remains to be considered the practicability of the waitand-see theory as applied to legal contingent remainders and
executory interests. It might be expected that if this principle
is likely to create trouble in connection with reversions and
feudally vested remainders, even more problems would arise
where the validity of contingent remainders and executory devises is at issue. This can best be tested in concrete terms and al-
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though legal contingent remainders (assumed to be indestructible) are used in the examples given, they could, without significant alteration, as well be executory interests. Suppose a gift to A
for life, remainder to such of his children as reach the age of 30
years. Here a legal life estate, a legal contingent remainder and
a reversion are outstanding. If we say that possession and enjoyment within the period of the rule is required and if we are willing to wait until 21 years after A's death to determine whether
all of A's children have then reached 30, the remainder will turn
out to be valid if all of the children have in fact reached 30.
Meanwhile the state of the title is uncertain and if, at the expiration of the period of the rule, some of the children are not yet
30 the whole gift over fails unless we are willing to split the class
and let those who have attained the given age take to the exclusion of the others. Even under the Massachusetts rule the status
of the title cannot be determined until A dies and although, under
the English Law Reform Committee proposal, it would be possible to have an earlier adjudication, no final determination could
be made until, upon the basis of existing facts, the remainder was
bound to be either good or bad. Moreover, the Law Reform Committee proposal contemplates the possibility of more than one
law suit which seems highly undesirable. If we modify these
approaches so as to eliminate the possibility of waiting-and-seeing
and still finding the remainder invalid, i.e., by accelerating the remainder at the expiration of 21 years from A's death and allowing
all of his children then living to take, we may save the remainder from destruction and approximate the intention of the maker
of the gift. However, we still have to wait-and-see, we still have
to determine when and how often we may litigate the title and
in the meanwhile we still have a title in limbo. Are we not better
off to be able to determine once and for all, the moment that
the gift becomes effective, what parts of it are good and what
parts are bad? We may presume A incapable of having more
children if that accords with the facts, we may construe the gift
to comprehend only children of A alive when the gift takes effect
if that is consistent with the testator's apparent intention, we may
allow only children of A who are nine or over at his death to
take, we may even reduce the age contingency from 30 to 21, but
let us litigate this title only once, and then once and for all. And
let us not, with all of these techniques available, consign a legal
title to realty or personalty even temporarily to outer space.
Proponents of wait-and-see may reply that with the applica-
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tion of one or more of the foregoing techniques the supposed
gift discussed in the preceding paragraph would be valid from its
inception and that it would be unnecessary to wait-and-see. That
is indeed true, because if A were a woman 70 years old she would
be presumed incapable of having any more children and all of
her children would have to reach 30 or not within their own lifetimes. And if she were of child-bearing age the gift would be saved
either by reducing the age contingency or by splitting the class.
In either event, it would not be necessary to wait-and-see. But that
may be as much, of an argument against as it is for the principle.
The example we have been dealing with is a fairly typical case and
it is not easy to find typical cases where other more acceptable
techniques do not offer most, if not all of the advantages, of waitand-see. In less usual cases, other suggestions to ameliorate the
rigors of the rule may not be effective and the disadvantages of
waiting-and-seeing may be more apparent. Thus, suppose a gift
to A for life, remainder to his unborn children, or their children,
during their lives, remainder to the children of A's children who
are living at the death of the last to die of A's children. If A is
a young person and has no children, no wait-and-see proposal will
permit of a declaration of title before A dies or is presumed, or
can be proved, to be incapable of having children. If A
has one or more children, the status of the title cannot be determined until all of them are dead, become incapable of having children or die within 21 years after A's death, or until the expiration
of 21 years after A's death, whichever event happens first. Waiting-and-seeing would cause great inconvenience which would
not be substantially alleviated by automatically terminating the
life estates 21 years after A's death and accelerating the contingent remainders. Such a statutory savings clause would simply
assure unmarketability for the period of the rule or until all of A's
children died. A like clause in the instrument of gift would of
course do the same thing, but because a good draftsman can produce undesirable results is not a reason why a legislature should
make such consequences inevitable.
It seems a fair conclusion that a rule directed against remoteness of possession could work with practicality on legal contingent remainders and executory interests and that "vested" executory interests should be subject to it. Because of problems of
title, certainty of vesting in possession and enjoyment, at the
date of the creation of such interests, should be required but
such a rule should be mollified by techniques (other than the
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wait-and-see principle) which are discussed elsewhere in this
article.
4. Possibilities of Reverter~ Rights of Entry and Options in
Gross. If the existing rule were changed by substituting "vesting
in possession and enjoyment" for "vesting in interest," it would
be difficult to hold any possibility of reverter or right of entry
valid unless the instrument of gift specified that the property
must revert or the right of entry be exercised in due time. Since
most possibilities of reverter and rights of entry are not subject
to any temporal restriction by the terms of the instrument
pursuant to which they arise, the rule would destroy most of
these interests if it insisted upon certainty of vesting in possession and enjoyment within the limits of time in the same fashion
that the present rule demands certainty of vesting in interest.
Although possibilities of reverter and rights of entry should certainly be subject to some time limitations unless they are created
as an incident of a commercial transaction, there is no particular
reason that most of them should be wholly invalid from their
inception. For this reason, and also because lives in being almost
never bear any reasonable relationship to determinable fees and
fees subject to conditions subsequent, it makes more sense to
specify a time limitation during which future interests following such dispositions may endure and to provide that at the end
of the time selected the future interests shall cease to exist.
It will be observed that the suggestion last made does not give
rise to any problem similar to that which would be created by declaring reversions to be void after the period of the rule expired,
i.e., causing titles to be in abeyance. For if property is left to a
church so long as it is used for church purposes, or subject to
a right of entry if it ceases to be used for such purposes, it can be
made plain that the effect of extinguishing the possibility of
reverter or right of entry at the end of some period of time is
to leave the title of the church absolute. Accordingly, it would be
feasible to exempt possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from
a rule directed at remoteness of possession and to provide that
they shall cease to exist at the expiration of a period of 30 to 50
years after their creation. The same treatment ought to be accorded executory interests following determinable fees and fees
subject to conditions subsequent unless incident to a family settlement in which case the rule against perpetuities should apply. Obviously, neither restriction should affect the validity of
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry when these devices
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are employed in connection with a bona fide commercial transaction such as a lease or mortgage.
Similar reasoning is applicable to options in gross although,
as before stated, there are those who think that options in gross
should not be restricted in time. 374 At all events, the same reasons
which militate against a rule which might invalidate possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry from their inception, and the
same lack of relevance of lives in being, indicate that no rule
against perpetuities, as such, should govern the validity of options
in gross. If they are to be subject to any time limits they should
be void only as to the excess. Options appendant to leases and
mortgages, or arising in connection with other commercial transactions, should be exempt not only from the rule against perpetuities but also from any other temporal restriction affecting
options in gross.
5. To Equitable Future Interests and the Duration of Trusts.
If, as suggested at the beginning of this part of this article, "possession and enjoyment" should mean "possession and enjoyment
free of any trust," a requirement of certainty of vesting in possession and enjoyment necessitates special treatment of equitable
interests. This may be illustrated by a gift to trustees to pay the income to A for life, and after his death to his unborn children
during their lives, and after they die to convey and distribute the
trust property to the X charity. The charity has a vested equitable
remainder and the rule would invalidate it. So would a similar
rule invalidate a vested legal remainder. But what of the equitable life estates of A's children? If their equitable right to income
constituted "possession and enjoyment" at A's death,875 the children's equitable life estates would be valid, but if "possession and
enjoyment free of any trust" is the requirement, a rule against
remoteness of possession would render the status of the children's
equitable life interests at least highly equivocal and might well
invalidate them on the ground that they would never be "possessed and enjoyed free of any trust." If the corpus were distributable to the children upon their attaining a given age, say 30, the
result would be no different for they might not get possession
and enjoyment within lives in being and 21 years. Such an outcome would of course be less serious than certain invalidation of
the entire trust which would occur even under the present rule if
SM MORRIS AND LEACH, 220.
875 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD

HAND 81 (1955).
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the rule does in fact destroy trusts which are to last too long.376
This is not, however, a clear consequence of the present rule.
Moreover, although life estates, legal or equitable, in unborn
persons are certainly less than desirable from a perpetuity standpoint, it is not consistent to sanction legal remainders for the
life of unborns if they vest in possession and enjoyment in due
time and to condemn all equitable life estates limited to unborns.
This may constitute a reason for taking a "second look" at a modified "wait-and-see" doctrine as applied to trusts since some may
feel that the intention of the maker of the gift is too harshly frustrated in the examples supposed above if all of the interests following A's equitable life estate are declared bad.
There are three major difficulties in the wait-and-see principle as it has been expounded by others: (1) it creates uncertainties as to titles and fetters marketability; (2) even after waitingand-seeing it may turn out that future interests created by an
instrument of gift are void; (3) it involves serious problems in
determining what measuring lives are to be used. A modified
wait-and-see doctrine, applicable only to trusts, akin to that explored (and rejected) in connection with legal interests, might
eliminate these stumbling blocks at least in part. If no trust
could last beyond the period of the rule but if all trusts were
assured of validity during that period there could be no uncertainty as to the trustee's title nor as to its marketability unless
the trustee were denied a power of sale. This he could and perhaps should be given by statute. If a statutory rule did not invalidate future interests, but could be drafted so that it provided
equitably for their acceleration at the ending of the period of
the rule as though the trust had come to its natural termination,
it would never be necessary to wait-and-see-only-to-find that the
purposes of the maker of the trust would be frustrated in spite of
waiting. The Pennsylvania statute attempts to achieve this result by giving "void" interests to the income takers. As will be
seen, this attempted solution involves complications. Finally, despite the invitation to the making of illusory gifts which might
be implied, it is arguable that the problem of determining measuring lives could be solved by confining these to persons who are
or might be beneficiaries of the instrument of gift or who are
referred to therein, and that illusory gifts could be discouraged

376 SIMES AND SMITH,

§§1391-1393. But cf. -MORRIS AND LEACH, 313-316.
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by providing for an alternative period of validity in gross, say 80
years.
The possibilities of achieving the foregoing objectives may
be tested against a gift such as that posed at the beginning of
this subdivision-a gift in trust for A £or life, and thereafter for
his unborn children during their lives, and thereafter for the
X charity in fee. The trust would terminate 21 years after A's
death or 80 years after the gift became effective, whichever event
occurred last. At that time the corpus would be distributed to
the X charity. But if A were only 30 when the gift became effective and thereafter had two children who were very young when
he died, the effect would be to reduce their interests in the income
to substantially less than the maker of the gift intended them to
have. Indeed, in this case the acceleration of the charitable gift
would probably not approximate the maker's intent as well as
would the Pennsylvania solution of dividing the corpus equally
between A's two children. A more equitable solution would be
to commute the children's equitable life estates and give the
balance of the corpus to the charity. This would be no more
difficult than the problems faced in any ordinary acceleration
case. But if the trustee had discretion as to the amount of income
to be paid to A's children or as to the allocation of income
between them, the valuation of their income interests could cause
extreme embarrassment, just as it could in applying the Pennsylvania solution of "vesting" void interests "in the person or persons entitled to the income at the expiration of the period" of
the rule.
The more usual gift in trust is exemplified by a gift to a
trustee to pay the income to the testator's children during their
lives and at their deaths to deliver the corpus to the testator's
grandchildren upon the attainment of a given age-25, 30 or 40.
In cases of this sort, the modified wait-and-see solution is easier
because the ultimate takers of corpus are also income takers.
Hence there is no problem of sharply reducing their interests by
terminating the trust before the testator provided it should end
and therefore the reason for evaluating their income interests
is absent. At the expiration of 21 years from the death of all of
the children and grandchildren who were living at the testator's
death, or 80 years after he died, whichever event happened last,
the trust would be terminated and the corpus would be distributed among the testator's grandchildren. There could be questions as to the destination of "shares" of deceased grandchildren,
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but these would be questions of transmissibility which we have
seen can never be altogether avoided. There would be no question of vesting for purposes of determining validity. Thus in the
case just discussed, a modified wait-and-see doctrine would be
workable. However, in considering the possibility of a general
application of such a doctrine in connection with trusts, one must
reckon with at least two additional and more difficult types of
disposition. First, how would alternative end limitations be treated? And, second, how could end limitations in favor of unascertained persons be accelerated?
As to alternative end limitations, suppose a gift in trust for
A for life, and then for his children during their lives and then
for the X charity in fee, followed by a gift over to the Y charity
if the X charity is not then in existence. What happens to the
alternative limitation over 21 years after A dies? The problem
is the same as that which arises when the question is whether any
defeasible future interest may be accelerated except that here it
is not possible to refuse to accelerate at all without violating a
rule against perpetuities concerned with remoteness of possession.
Thus, it would be necessary to provide (subject to evaluating
outstanding interests in income if that were decided upon) that
the trust should terminate at the expiration of the period of the
rule and that the corpus should then be distributed to the person
or persons who would have been entitled to receive it had the
event of termination specified by the instrument of gift in fact
occurred. In the case in question the X charity would take to the
exclusion of the Y charity so the alternative gift to the latter
would in effect be destroyed by the rule and not by the nonoccurrence of the event upon which it was limited to take effect.
Where the end limitations are in favor of unascertained persons an even more vexing dilemma may be posed. Suppose a gift
in trust to pay the income to the testator's children during their
lives and thereafter to pay the income to his grandchildren during their lives and thereafter to deliver the corpus to the heirs
of the grandchildren. Here, if grandchildren were alive when the
period of the rule expired, acceleration would be impossible
because their heirs could not be known. While a case of this kind
may be unusual it is a possibility that cannot be ignored and it
may well explain the provision in the Pennsylvania statute directing distribution, at the rule's end, to the persons then entitled
to income. At all events, this case makes it clear that it would
not be enough to say that when the limits of time had ended
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trust property should go to those who would have received it had
the trust terminated according to its terms. Such a provision
would have to be supplemented by an alternative if those who
then would have taken cannot be ascertained. That alternative
might have to be the Pennsylvania provision, which, as already observed, is not without significant infirmities.
Enough has been said to demonstrate that it is not easy to
devise a wait-and-see doctrine, even as applied to trusts, which
overcomes the objection of waiting-to-see-only-to-find that invalid
interests are created. The modifications of the wait-and-see proposals of others which have been explored ought to eliminate some
of the criticisms which have been directed at the wait-and-see
principle. But the crux of the suggestions made here is the idea of
avoiding any possibility of invalidity, and that cannot be done
except through the acceleration process. Justly applied, acceleration would ordinarily have to be accompanied by the evaluation
of income interests which were cut short. This complication
would often be accentuated by the existence of discretionary
powers over income which, for tax reasons, are becoming increasingly popular. And where possible takers are unascertainable there
can be no acceleration. In such instances, and indeed whenever
there is acceleration of one of two or more alternative end limitations, a future interest is destroyed despite wait-and-see.
Although it would not be impossible to fashion a reasonably
acceptable wait-and-see rule as applied to trusts, complexity is
apparently an inherent characteristic of the doctrine if it is to
operate equitably. Furthermore, as we have seen, most of the
objectives of the principle can be achieved by simpler means.
Accordingly, if simplicity is a worthy purpose of perpetuity reform, then, on balance, the game of wait-and-see may be hardly
worth the candle. Indeed, very few trusts would be endangered by
a rule against perpetuities which demanded certainty of vesting
in possession and enjoyment free of any trust if: (a) lives in being
and 21 years were changed to lives in being and 30 or 40 years,
or alternatively to a 75 or 80 year period in gross; (b) women
over 50 or 55, men over a statistically acceptable age, and girls
and boys under 13 or 14 were conclusively presumed to be incapable of having or adopting children; (c) medical evidence
as to inability to bear or procreate children were admissible; (d)
courts were directed, for perpetuity purposes, to consider reasonable probabilities, not remote possibilities, and to presume within reason that the maker of a gift intended it to be valid; and .
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finally (e) age contingencies in excess of 21 were reduced to 21
wherever by doing so, after taking full account of (h), (c) and (d),
an otherwise void gift would be made valid. It is true that even
under such a rule equitable life estates in unborn persons would
probably be invalid and that this would not conform to the consequence of the same rule that legal life estates in unborn persons would be valid. But this inconsistency seems inevitable unless the concept of vesting is retained or unless the wait-and-see
principle, with all its many entanglements, is accepted. It seems
obvious that trusts which serve a valid commercial purpose should
be subject to no rule at all.
6. To Resulting Trusts. A requirement of certainty of vesting
in possession and enjoyment within the period of the rule would
not cause resulting trust interests incident to non-commercial
private trusts (which are of course exempt from the existing rule)
to be too remote. A private trust for non-commercial purposes
would have to end within the period of the rule; if it did not,
any future interests thereafter limited to take effect in possession
and enjoyment would be void. Thus most trusts would either
have accomplished their purposes within the period of the rule
or would have to come to an end at the expiration of the allotted
time. So a testamentary trust for the benefit of A (being a person
capable of having more children) for life, and then for the benefit
of his children until they reached 40, and thereafter to be distributed to them, would involve an attempt to create void future
interests in A's children unless the class were split so as to comprehend only children of A alive when the gift was made or the age
contingency were reduced from 40 to 21. If the future interests
were void, the property would at A's death be held upon a resulting trust for the benefit of the testator's heirs. The purposes of
the testamentary trust would have been accomplished, to the extent that they could be, within the period of the rule and the
interests of the testator's heirs would vest in possession and enjoyment free of the trust within that time. The same would be
true with respect to any private trust. Therefore, subjecting resulting trust interests incident to private trusts to the rule should
create no problem, though perhaps, for purposes of clarity, they
should be exempted from the operation of any statutory rule
against perpetuities.
It is not so easy to dispose of the resulting trust interests which
may arise upon the failure of purpose of a charitable trust created
for a particular purpose. Where the charitable purpose is general,
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cy pres is available and there can be no resulting trust. But if the
gift is in trust for the benefit of the X church and none other and
the X church ceases to exist after the period of the rule has expired, what is to become of the subject matter of the gift if the
rule is applicable and the resulting trust which would otherwise
arise is void? Surely the trustees should not have the unrestricted
beneficial ownership of it,377 though perhaps this possibility should
cause no more concern than the invalidation of possibilities of
reverter after a specified period of time. What becomes of property given to a church so long as it shall be used for church purposes if the church ceases thus to use the property after the possibility of reverter becomes void as it has been suggested here that
it should? The answer as to resulting trust interests, and also
with respect to possibilities of reverter, must lie in a modified
statutory executive cy pres power,378 for neither type of interest
ought to be free from any temporal restriction whatever.
7. To Class Gifts. The effect upon class gifts of a rule directed
at remoteness of possession is implicit from the discussions above
of the application of such a rule to vested remainders, contingent
remainders and executory devises and to equitable interests and
the duration of trusts. However, since the application of the
present rule to class gifts is of such signal importance and has
been the subject matter of so much literature, completeness demands that class gifts be commented upon separately. The basic
problem in connection with class gifts under the present rule
arises from its insistence that the precise share of each member
of the class must be determined within the period of the rule.
This would be unaffected by changing the requirement of vesting in interest to one of vesting in possession. All that is right and
wrong (except application to remoteness of vesting alone) concerning the application of the present rule to class gifts would
remain the same. The several remedies which have been discussed in detail in the earlier pages of this article would involve
the same merits and the same difficulties. Hence, if cy pres and
377 But see the extraordinary vacillation concerning this point in American Colonization Society v. Soulsby, 129 Md. 605, 99 A. 944 (1917); Soulsby v. American Colonization
Society, 131 Md. 296, 101 A. 780 (1917); American Colonization Society v. Latrobe, 132
Md. 524, 104 A. 120 (1918); Latrobe v. American Colonization Society, 134 Md. 406, 106
A. 858 (1919).
378 Cf. the provisions of llhe Illinois statute concerning distribution, upon dissolution,
of the assets of a not-for-profit corporation. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §§163a43 to 163a45.
These provisions are ably construed in McDonough County Orphanage v. Burnhart, 5
Ill. (2d) 230, 125 N.E. (2d) 625 (1955).
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wait-and-see are to be rejected under the present rule as applied
to class gifts, they ought not to be accepted under a rule concerned with remoteness of possession. If presumptions that a
valid gift is intended and as to the capacity to bear and procreate
children, the reduction of age contingencies and the splitting of
classes ought to be rejected under the present rule, these techniques should not be invoked under a rule concerned with remoteness of possession. On the other hand if the reduction of
age contingencies, the splitting of classes and presumptions of
validity and incapacity to bear or procreate children are worthy
of consideration under the present rule, they are equally deserving
of reflection in conjunction with a rule related to remoteness of
possession. In short, such a rule would be no worse and no better,
save for the simplification to be gained by eliminating the concept
of vesting, as it pertained to class gifts.
8. To Powers of Appointment, Powers of Sale and Other Administrative Powers. Under the existing rule against perpetuities
a power of appointment which is not certain to be exercised within the period of the rule is bad unless the power is one pursuant
to which the donee, by his action alone and within the limits of
time, may make himself the mvner of the appointive property.879
But a power which cannot be exercised after the expiration of
the period of the rule is not invalid merely because remote
appointments may be made under it.380 Hence it cannot be said
that the existence of the vice of remoteness in a power is the
result of the possibility that an interest may arise from the exercise
of the power which is not certain to vest within the perpetuity
period. It is the power itself which is void, though of course it
will be invalidated, even if exercisable in due time, by the fact
that only remote appointments can be made under it. It may
therefore be said that a requirement of certainty of possession and
enjoyment within the period of the rule would only slightly alter
the law as to the validity of powers of appointment, for the time
within which a power would have to be exercisable would be the
same. The only change which would be wrought would be in cases
where nothing but remote appointments could be made under
a power. Thus, under the present rule a testamentary power in A,

379 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.31-24.32; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483 at 613;
GRAY, §§474.1-485; MORRIS AND LEACH, 131-136; SIMES AND SMITH, §1273.
380 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.32 at 95; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483 at
612-613; GRAY, §510; MORRIS AND I.EACH, 136-137; SIMES AND SMITH, §1274 at 210.
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a life tenant, to make appointments to his unborn children to
become effective in possession 40 years after his death would be
good, because although A might make remote appointments, he
could make appointments which would be certain to vest in
interest at his death. But under a rule directed at remoteness of
possession the same power would be bad because A could not
make appointments which would or could become possessory
within 21 years after his death. If one is prepared to accept the
suggestion that vesting should be rejected as a criterion of validity,
this additionally restrictive effect on the creation of powers of
appointment does not appear serious.
As to whether powers of appointment are validly exercised
or not, a rule concerned with remoteness of possession would
operate in a fashion parallel to the present rule. The validity of
appointments made under special powers and general testamentary powers would be measured from the effective date of the
creating instrument except of course in those jurisdictions where
the time of exercise of general testamentary powers is the date
when the period of the rule commences to run. 381 Likewise, the
modified wait-and-see principle which has always been applicable
in connection with the exercise of powers would remain unchanged. Account would be taken of events which had actually
occurred up until the time of exercise of a power just as it is
under the existing rule. 382 Whether this would be done with
respect to gifts in default of appointment would depend upon
whether or not the view of the Massachusetts court383 which followed the recommendations of American Law of Property384 meets
with general acceptance. Any further extension of the wait-andsee doctrine in connection with the validity of appointments, as,
for instance, waiting-and-seeing after a power was once exercised,
would involve the same considerations that have been discussed
in conjunction with the doctrine as applied to other future interests. It may be observed that this is not quite true when the
validity of the power itself is at issue, for the mere fact that a

S816 .AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY, §§24.33-24.34; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483 at
614-616; GRAY, §§514-530.4; MORRIS AND LEA.CH, 137-138; SIMI:S AND SMITH, §1274 at
210-2ll, §1275.
S82 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.35; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483 at 615; GRAY,
§§523.2-523.6; MORRIS AND LEA.CH, 143-145; SIMES AND SMITH, §1274 at 2ll-212.
SSSSears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952).
S84 6 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY, §24.36. Cf. contra, Simes, "Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 at 181-182 (1953).
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power is certain to be exercised during the period of the rule
does not make it any less of a fetter as long as it is extant nor
assure the validity of appointments under it. Thus it could be
argued that no serious harm would result from permitting all
powers of appointment to last for the period of the rule and providing that at the end of that time they would lapse. Although
powers of appointment in one sense have a restrictive effect, they
do in another sense serve the purpose of the rule against perpetuities because they loosen the grasp of the dead hand. These
latter observations are of course as much applicable to the present
rule as they are to a rule directed at remoteness of possession.
Powers to sell, lease and mortgage, as well as other administrative powers, should be distinguished, for perpetuity purposes,
from powers of appointment. When such powers are vested in a
fiduciary they further the purposes of the rule against perpetuities
and they ought never to be invalidated by the rule 385-whether
it is directed at remoteness of vesting or remoteness of possession.
It may be noted that a rule against remoteness of possession would
cause all private trusts to end within the time limits that it
specified, so that the application or non-application of the rule
, to powers of the type under discussion should no longer be a
source of concern if such a rule should be adopted. Perhaps,
however, it should be made clear that such powers should not
be invalidated merely because a fiduciary might exercise them,
as incident to his duties in terminating a trust, after the period
of the rule had expired.
It is not so clear where no trust exists that a power to sell,
lease or mortgage necessarily promotes the objectives of the rule
against perpetuities. If the exercise of a power of sale may or
will alter the destination of the property,386 then of course it is
comparable to a power of appointment and factors relevant to
the application of the rule to powers of appointment apply. But
even if a power to sell constitutes merely a mechanical means of
delivering a title, which one would suppose would always enhance marketability, cases may be found where the existence of
the power may in a sense restrain alienability.387 Such cases, how-

385 Leach, "Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against Perpetuities,'' 47
HARV. L. REv. 948 (1934).
386 See, e.g., Ware v. Polhill, 11 Ves. Jr. 257, 32 ·Eng. Rep. 1087 (1805).
387 See Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Harloff, 133 N.J. Eq. 44, 30 A. (2d) 57
(1943); Supplementary Memorandum 133 N.J. Eq. 60, 34 A. (2d) 135 (1943).

1958]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

947

ever, are uncommon and it is certainly more usual that a power
to sell free of encumbering future interests not only facilitates
the disposition and development of property but also lessens the
control of the dead hand. The same would generally be true of
powers to lease and mortgage, though it is possible to imagine
that an ill-conceived long-term lease could hamper the economic
growth of a parcel of real estate in the hands of those whose
future interests fell in after the lease was made. But this may be
equally true with respect to the ultimate successors to property
leased by a trustee or even by one holding a fee simple title. On
balance, it appears that powers to sell, lease and mortgage, whether
incident to a trust or not, should not be invalid merely because
they might have been exercised after the period of the rule expired. At that time, however, the power should also expire.
9. To Administrative Contingencies. Gifts conditioned upon
the probate of a will or upon the happening of some other "administrative contingency" have been held invalid under the
present rule on the theory that they might not vest in interest
within the limits of time. 388 Cases of this kind have produced
harsh results because it is clear that the maker of a gift does not
contemplate the possibility that the contingency could ever occur
after the period of the rule has expired. In some states an attempt
has been made to ameliorate this phase of the rule by providing
that the vesting of a limitation shall not be regarded as deferred
for purposes of the rule against perpetuities merely because it is
conditioned upon the probate of a will or because it consists of
a gift to an executor or a trustee under a will. 389 Such statutes are
effective under the present rule in respect of the particular
administrative contingencies to which they apply. They do not,
however, necessarily save future interests which are conditioned
upon the sale of property or upon the happening of some other
administrative contingency, such as the exhaustion of the "magic
gravel pit."390 What is more important for purposes of the
present discussion, they would not protect a future interest from

388 Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45,
170 NE. 699 (1930); Hodam v. Jordan, (E.D. Ill. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 183. But see Belfield
v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893); Monarski v. Greb, 407 Ill. 281, 95 N:E. (2d)
433 (1950).
389 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 30, §153a; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.220. See note, 55
MrcH. L. R.Ev. 1040 (1957).
·
390 In re Wood, [1894] 3 Ch. 381.

948

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

a rule against perpetuities which demanded certainty of vesting
in possession within the prescribed period.
From the foregoing it seems clear that a rule against remoteness of possession ought certainly to take account of the administrative contingency cases and that it would have to do so in a
manner different from that provided by statutes such as those
discussed in the preceding paragraph. This could be effectively
accomplished (as indeed it might under the present rule) through
the presumption technique. In so doing, it would be necessary
to anticipate as many common administrative contingencies as
possible and to provide that where a gift is conditioned upon the
happening of a contingency it shall be presumed that the maker
of the gift intended that the contingency must occur, if at all,
within a reasonable time. Such a time might be specified as 21
years if the present period in gross is retained or, if it is lengthened,
then the longer period should of course be used. Probably, in
addition to referring to specific contingencies, such as the probate
of a will, the sale of assets, the appointment of an executor or
trustee, reference should also be made to the happening of "any
other administrative contingency."

B. Concluding Suggestions

It must be apparent that it is the opinion of the writer that
the question which is the title of this article should be answered
affirmatively. It is equally plain that a rule against perpetuities
which merely substituted "vest in possession free of any trust"
for "vest" would be even harsher and even less workable than
the present rule. The reasons for this have been detailed in the
preceding pages and it will serve no purpose to repeat them. Likewise, it is unnecessary to reiterate what should be done to the rule
in addition to discarding its vest, for those reforms which have
been suggested by others and which appear practicable have been
summarized in the concluding portion of the second part of this
article. Here, instead of restating what has preceded by way of
conclusion, an attempt will be made, in the form of a specific
proposal for legislation, to assemble the good and to reject what
appears to be bad.
The following tentative proposal does not embody even a
modified wait-and-see proposal. It is, however, recognized that
a statute which did so might be particularly attractive to fidu-
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ciaries. The difficulties of drafting a workable wait-and-see statute
have already been fully considered and if one were to be attempted the most painstaking care would have to be given its construction. Although what follows is offered with a good deal of trepidation, a start must be made somewhere because it is abundantly
clear that the rule against perpetuities cannot be remolded by
the judicial process to meet its present-day objectives.

An Act Concerning Perpetuities
Section 1. The rule of property known as the rule against
perpetuities is abolished.
Section 2. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
interest in real or personal property is good unless it must
vest if at all, in possession and enjoyment, free of any trust,
within (i) thirty years after some life in being at the date of
the creation of the interest or (ii) eighty years after the date
of the creation of the interest, whichever period is longer.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to:
(i) legal or equitable reversions, but no reversion may
be transferred or otherwise disposed of by the instrument as a result of which it arises;
(ii) possibilities of reverter, rights of entry or resulting
trusts incident to any trust or other disposition for
charitable, religious or educational purposes or incident to any business transaction;
(iii) options incident to any business transaction;
(iv) resulting trusts arising because of the invalidity of
any interest attempted to be created pursuant to the
terms of any private trust;
(v) powers of appointment, powers to sell, lease or mortgage property, and powers which contribute to the
effective management of trust assets, including without limitation powers to determine what is principal
and what is income and powers to name successor
trustees; provided that (A) no such power shall be
exercised after the expiration of the period specified
in subsection (a) except incidentally to the termination of a trust, and (B) nothing herein contained shall
be deemed to exempt appointments made under a
power of appointment from the provisions of subsection (a);
(vi) trusts or other dispositions for charitable, religious,
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educational, or business purposes when the property
being the subject matter thereof must vest, if at all,
in possession in the trustee or other designated taker
within the period specified in subsection (a), and
limitations over for charitable, religious or educational
purposes following valid trusts or other dispositions
for such purposes;
(vii) trusts created for a business purpose as, or in connection with, a plan for the benefit of all or some of
the employes of one or more employers, including,
but without limitation, death benefit, disability, pension, profit sharing, stock bonus or unemployment
benefit plans, for the purpose of distributing for the
benefit of the employes, including their beneficiaries,
the earnings and the principal, or either, of the funds
held in trust;
(viii) trusts or other dispositions for cemetery care when
the property being the subject matter thereof must •
vest, if at all, in possession in the trustee or other
designated taker within the period specified in subsection (a) and when the trustee or other designated
taker is an association or corporation organized for
cemetery purposes under the laws of this state;
(c) The period specified in subsection (a) shall not commence to run while any one living person has the unrestricted
power to transfer to himself the entire legal and equitable
interest in the property free of any trust.
Section 3. In determining whether an interest is valid or
invalid it shall be presumed that the interest was intended
to be valid and unlikely contingencies shall be disregarded.
Section 4. Without limiting the generality of Section 3, in
determining whether an interest is valid or invalid:
(a) it shall be conclusively presumed that (i) a female over
fifty-five years of age is incapable of bearing or adopting a
child, (ii) a minor under thirteen years of age is incapable
of procreating, bearing or adopting a child and (iii) a male
over seventy [?] years of age is incapable of procreating or
adopting a child;
(b) except as to persons described in subsection (a), medical evidence as to the capability of any person of procreating
or bearing a child shall be admissible;
·
(c) where the interest is conditioned upon the probate of
a will, the appointment of an executor or trustee, the payment of debts, the sale of assets or the happening of any like
administrative contingency, it shall be presumed to have been
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intended that the contingency must occur, if at all, within
thirty years from the date of the creation of the interest;
(d) where the interest, but for this subsection, would be
invalid because it is made to depend upon any person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess of twenty-one, the
age contingency shall be reduced to twenty-one as to all persons subject to the same age contingency.
Section 5. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b),
no possibility of reverter, right of entry, resulting trust or
limitation over which is incident to any trust or other disposition for charitable, religious or educational purposes shall
be valid for more than fifty years from the date of its
creation.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to:
(i) possibilities of reverter, rights of entry or resulting
trusts incident to any lease, mortgage or other business transaction;
(ii) limitations over for charitable, religious or educational purposes following valid trusts or other dispositions for such purposes .
. (c) If property is disposed of, whether in trust or otherwise, for a particular charitable, religious or educational
purpose, and if, after the expiration of a period of fifty years,
the particular charitable purpose ceases to exist or becomes
incapable of accomplishment, the holder of the legal title
to the property shall apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for directions as to the disposition thereof. The court
shall have power to and shall direct that the property and the
income therefrom, or either, shall thenceforth be used for
a charitable, religious or educational purpose as nearly
approximating the original purpose as may be possible under
the circumstances. This subsection shall not be construed as
restricting, but as enlarging upon, the judicial cy pres power.
Section 6. No option in gross shall be valid for more than
fifty years from the date of its creation.
Section 7. This Act shall be known as the "Statute on Perpetuities" and shall apply only to instruments which become
effective after the effective date of this Act.
The foregoing is put fonvard with no sense of finality and
with the greatest deference to the able scholars whose views it
rejects. It is a "first draft," tendered with the hope that it may
evoke the comment and criticism not only of those who have
specialized in the field of future interests, but also of the many
practitioners whose experience has intrigued them with the rule
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against perpetuities. Legislation is good only if it advances the
moral, cultural, economic and spiritual values cherished by a
free society. Good legislation must embody the thought, comment and discussion of many. Good perpetuity legislation is an
important and urgent adjunct of the institution of property as it
is known to our society and as we may earnestly hope to continue
to know it-albeit subject to such modifications as a dynamic
social order may require-even as man, now for the first time,
reaches physically toward the stars.

